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
Brief History of the 46th Ohio Volunteers.

By Col. T: WORTHINGTON, in his 74th Year.



HORSE REARS AT A SHOT THROUGH THE WITHERS.

Col. Tom Worthington receiving the first fire at Shiloh, at noon.



PREFACE.

Col. Worthington's regimental report not having been included in Ex. Doc. No. 66, June, 1862, being entitled "*Reports of officers in relation to recent battles at Pittsburg Landing,*" he requested its publication among the war papers now in course of publication by the Government, and in June, 1877, received the letter as follows:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON CITY, June 4th, 1877.

Col. T. WORTHINGTON,
Morrow, Warren Co., Ohio.

DEAR SIR: The Secretary of War directs me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th ultimo, transmitting your report of the operations of the 46th Ohio Volunteers, 1st Brigade, 5th Division, at Shiloh, April 6th, 1862, &c., and in reply thereto I have the honor to inform you that the report will be included among the papers to be published, *not, however*, as reports made during the war, but as one furnished subsequently to supply deficiency in data.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant.

TH: J. SAUNDERS,
Compiler of the Rebellion Records.

The following winter he filed the report with Col. Scott, having charge of the publication of the war documents, a copy of which, with immaterial alteration, is below published for the especial benefit of the 46th Ohio Volunteers.

Whenever means will permit, another edition will be published, with proper maps and illustrations, and the names of all the members of the 46th present at the first fire about noon, April 6th, 1862.

With extreme regret that he is compelled by poverty to submit this irregular and imperfect history to the regiment, and hoping to see most of them at some future time, he remains, their grateful old commander at Shiloh April 6th and 7th, 1862,

T. WORTHINGTON.

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HISTORY IN BRIEF
OF THE
46th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry,
WHILE UNDER COLONEL WORTHINGTON'S COMMAND.

WRITTEN FOR THE SURVIVORS OF THAT REGIMENT
AND THE FRIENDS OF THE DEAD.

CHAPTER I.

The 46th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry was organized at Worthington, Franklin county, Ohio, by T. Worthington, a West Point graduate of 1827, and elected General 2d brigade, 7th division, Ohio militia in June, 1839. This regiment was recruited under an order of General Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, dated July 29, 1861, mainly from the counties of Franklin, Van Wert, Fairfield, and Licking.

The organization was completed in January, 1862, as follows:

Field and Staff.

T. Worthington, colonel, Warren county, Ohio.

C. C. Walcut, lieutenant-colonel, Franklin county, Ohio.

Wm. Smith, major, Van Wert county, Ohio.

Jack Neil, adjutant, Franklin county, Ohio.

E. Giesy, quartermaster, Fairfield county, Ohio.

J. B. Foster, sergeant-major, Franklin county, Ohio.

— Parsons, quartermaster sergeant.

On the 17th February, 1862, the regiment started from Columbus under orders to report to General W. T. Sherman at Padueah, Kentucky, and Colonel Worthington, reaching that place after night February 20, reported to General Sherman accordingly.

In consideration of the important part taken by this regiment in the Tennessee campaign of 1862, it should here be recorded that Colonel Worthington, surprised to hear that Florence, at the foot of the muscle shoals, where the railroad from Memphis to Charleston strikes the Tennessee River, had not been occupied immediately after the capture of Fort Henry, requested to be dispatched thither with a sufficient force to hold the place and prevent the anticipated junction of General A. S. Johnson, about that time driven from Nashville, with the troops of General Polk, soon after driven from Columbus, and others collecting at Corinth from Mobile and New Orleans under Generals Bragg and Beauregard.

To this request Sherman replied that such, as he understood, was not immediately intended by General Halleck, in command of the district, but that he could send the 46th Ohio, if requested, to the army of the Mississippi, under General Pope. This Colonel W. of course declined, as the Upper Tennessee plainly was to be, as eventuated, the main battle-ground in the Southwest.

Colonel W. then, under a previous arrangement with General O. M. Mitchell, an old West Point school-mate, proposed that he should be attached to Mitchell's division, on the Cumberland. This General Sherman also declined doing, but intimated that Colonel W. might, if he chose, be left in command of Fort Anderson, at Padueah. This, as it would keep the 46th out of the coming campaign, Colonel W. also declined.

Had he accepted either proposition so as to have been absent from Shiloh, the loss of thousands of millions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of men, besides the utter

desolation of the South, would have been the result consequent upon the capture or dispersion of two great Union armies at Shiloh, so nearly accomplished (as will once be proven) by the efforts of two or more Union commanders, whose treachery, escaping punishment by the unfortunate agency of the 46th Ohio, has placed them in the highest civil and military positions under the Government of the Republic, which it will some time hence be proven they intended to destroy.

CHAPTER II.

INTO THE ENEMY'S COUNTRY.

March 6, 1862, Colonel W. received the order as follows:

[SPECIAL ORDER No. 74.]

"HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,

"PADUCAH, March 6, 1862.

"The following regiments will embark to-day for Savannah, Tennessee River, and there report to Major-General Smith.

"The commanding officers will see that their regiments have eighty rounds of ammunition and all the means of transportation on hand. Baggage must be reduced to the minimum, and the quartermaster, Captain Pearse, will obtain a house in which to deposit all baggage left behind.

"Ohio 46th, Colonel Worthington; Ohio 48th, Colonel Sullivan; Illinois 40th, Colonel Hicks; Ohio 53d, Colonel Appler; Ohio 72d, Colonel Buckland.

"The quartermaster will at once provide the transportation necessary.

"By order of Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman.

"F. H. HAMMOND, A. A. G."

It will be observed that the order makes no provision for the sick men, of whom there were many hundreds, nor for stores of any kind, except ammunition, not to be had. That there were no proper hospital stores, and neither hay, oats, nor straw even, for the draft animals, might be accounted for by the exhaustion of this material of war for the consumption of the three divisions of McCleernand, C.

F. Smith, and L. Wallace, then at or near Fort Henry, which divisions, however, reached Savannah in about the same state of destitution; and General Sherman, a month later, admits that some of the regiments reached Camp Shiloh even without ammunition. But hospitals and quarters for the sick were plenty at Paducah. There was no possible excuse for the extravagance, impolicy, and inhumanity of hauling sick men to crowded boats, where to properly care for them was impossible; and to carry them with the army, as was done, *to die*, was simply barbarous.

The surgeons, of their own motion, found empty houses, and did the best they could for the dangerously sick, though all weak and ailing men should, as a matter of expediency if not humanity, have been left behind.

Of the above-named regimental commanders ordered up the Tennessee, Colonel Worthington, 46th Ohio, was the only educated military officer. He was sufficiently provident to take on board ten days' additional stores of army rations for his men and provender (nothing but shelled corn) for his mules and horses. Of the eighty rounds of ammunition ordered, but thirty could be had, and that at 11 P. M., or after.

His stores were all on board, and he embarked (just one month before the battles of the 6th and 7th of April following) at 3 A. M. of the 7th of March, 1862. The boat (Adams) neared Fort Henry about noon that day, and about all the boats which had left Paducah the day before were still there, besides many others intended for the transportation of the three divisions from Fort Donelson to the future field of Shiloh.

Drawing up on the west side to make inquiries, the 46th Ohio found itself next the boat of the 5th Ohio cavalry, Colonel Taylor. On inquiry it was found that this regiment had been there near a week, waiting orders, and that there was one gunboat and perhaps a single transport gone up the river. During our two weeks' delay at Paducah, there

had been rumors of ill treatment of Union men at Savannah, who had expected we would have immediately taken possession of Florence, Alabama, as urged by General Buell, immediately after the capture of Fort Henry. On this reliance many had expressed their sentiments too freely, and thereby suffered in various ways. A general draft of all men fit to bear arms had been contemplated, and as it is one of the first rules of an intended invasion to move to the objective point as rapidly as possible, it was concluded, *nem. con.*, to proceed, as there was no signal for the boat from Fort Henry. Beyond this there was some chance of forage for the teams before the advance of the army, momentarily expected, and the regiment accordingly steamed on up. The colonel of the 46th would have continued all night, and urged the master of the boat to do so, but he was apprehensive, he said, of masked batteries upon either shore, and nothing was left but reluctant acquiescence. The colonel's diary of the 8th is as follows:

*"Saturday, March 8th, 1862.—A fair frosty morning. Started about sunrise, and about 8.30 A. M. stopped at Britt's landing, and took aboard 98 bushels and 426 sheaves of oats. Stopped at Clifton and other landings, but heard nothing satisfactory. Got to Savannah about sunset. Found there one-half of the 40th Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Booth. Took command, and threw out 120 men as pickets—also a patrol, which took up 40 or 50 stragglers of the 40th, who were invading the houses, and, as the people thought, threatening mischief, there being a *bar* on board the boat. Saw a Union man, Mr. W. H. Cherry, and got him to send a servant to Waynesboro, 30 miles northeast, for information. Heard that the rebel authorities, in anticipation of our arrival, were hauling stores from the river below, around by Florence to Iuka, all of which would have been stopped but for the delay in sending troops to Florence a month before. This half of the 40th Illinois had passed Fort Henry in the night of the 6th, and, taking little note of circumstance or time, had reached Savannah about an hour by sun. It might have been in danger but for the arrival of the 46th, which last it was afterwards rumored, at home, had been captured by ignorantly going ahead of the fleet, &c. But the arrival was most timely. From Mr. Cherry was derived information that the rebel authorities were active in the vicinity—that there had been a draft *en masse* of the able-bodied male population the previous Thursday, and the drafted men were ordered to muster at Savannah on Monday, the 10th of March following."*

Deeming it his duty to get as full a report as possible of

the state of affairs in the vicinity for the information of General C. F. Smith on his arrival, he, as stated in the above diary extract, employed and dispatched a scout in the direction of Waynesboro. During the night many refugees came to the boat from the west side of the river. Many came into the town from the eastward on hearing of the arrival of Union troops, and perhaps more than a thousand drafted men from all quarters crowded the little village next day.

On Sunday, the 9th, the 46th had a dress parade, and, in connection with the incoming refugees from the rebel draft, this Sunday was pronounced the liveliest day the little town of less than one thousand inhabitants had ever witnessed. At about 2 P. M. several officers of the 46th went up in the gunboat Lexington, by invitation of Captain Gwin, to Pittsburgh landing, eight miles above, and threw, perhaps, a dozen shell into the interior, to which there was no reply.

Savannah is the county-seat of Hardin county, and is joined on the west by McNairy county. From the drafted refugees mainly of these two counties the 46th received during the day forty or fifty recruits. Night came on with no news of the fleet below, much to the surprise of the 46th. Ohio, which, being the last regiment to embark at Paducah, had had little thought of being the first full regiment to reach its destination in advance of the Army of the Tennessee, so famous afterwards in the war.

On Monday, the 10th, daylight came on with rain. Lieutenant-Colonel Booth, of the 40th Illinois, found himself out of stores, and the colonel of the 46th, declining his request to forage upon the people of the town, gave him two days' rations, and an order to proceed down the river and look up the army fleet. This was deemed an affront which Colonel Hicks, of the 40th Illinois, and commander of the brigade, was disposed to resent, and did afterwards resent, as an insult to himself and his regiment.

A river boat, crowded with troops, being the last place suitable for sick men, they were got out to-day, and put into a vacant house near the river, which had been emptied by its owner, who was an officer in the Confederate army. He had, however, with usual southern hospitality, authorized Mr. Cherry to allow its occupation by our sick or wounded, should our troops appear in his absence; doubtless, also, aware of the good policy of making a virtue of necessity.

Arrangements were also made for the fitting-up of a new frame church, with the consent of the village authorities, for a government hospital; it having been understood that here was to be a large army depot for weeks or months, whence the troops would march to break up railroads, or rebel camps at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt (humbug). During Sunday and Monday the pickets of the 46th had captured half a dozen or more of rebel scouts and horsemen, with their horses and mules, and learned that there was a large force of Confederate troops gathering or expected about Florence, Tuscumbia, Eastport, and Iuka, then expecting our attack on the first-named place, as it had been expected a full month before.

Tuesday, the 11th, was a fair, cool morning. The troops were brought ashore to clean up the boat, and most of the sick were made more comfortable in the improvised hospitals, the villagers doing all service in their power; for which they had and still have the grateful recollections of the troops and their commander—Mr. William H. Cherry being among the foremost in this friendly and, indeed, charitable ministration, for which no provision had been made by our commander.

Several Confederates were captured to-day, and among them one of the regular rebel cavalry, who had been sent in to see what was going on among the Yankee invaders of the “sacred soil.”

The steamer Golden Gate came up about noon, and an-

nounced the Union fleet of boats at hand. The 46th Ohio was paraded on the hill above the landing on open ground, where a fair view could be had of the approaching Army of the Tennessee.

The first boats came in sight about 2 p. m., some two miles down the river, and it was a sight fraught with splendor for the 46th Ohio—a spectacle beheld by no other regiment in the army. The weather was soft and fine, and one or more flags floated over every boat. Nearly every regiment had a band of music, and in this till then sequestered region occurred a scene of martial activity and festivity never before witnessed in the Union. Unexpected, grand, and indeed terrible it was to the inhabitants along the forest-girded banks of the Tennessee.

It was soon, however, discovered, that however beneficial to the people of the vicinity and to the interests of the Union had been the arrival of the 46th Ohio in advance of the army, it was anything but agreeable to General C. F. Smith and the general officers of the Army of the Tennessee. General Smith, irritable from ill-health and ill-habits, was furious at what he denominated the presumption and insubordination of a colonel of volunteers in preceding such an expedition in command of a regular officer of the army of the United States and major-general of Union volunteers. He refused to receive the colonel's report, and rebuked him for disregard of military etiquette in not passing his report through his commander of brigade and division, with whom his orders had nothing to do; and to do this would have been impossible without disobeying the order of the 6th, (No. 74,) which was peremptory to proceed to Savannah and there report to Major-General C. F. Smith, who was on the leading boat of the fleet, where the colonel of the 46th found and offered him his report.

It also soon appeared that the division commander was equally irate at the too prompt arrival of the 46th, whose colonel he had snubbed at midnight for being slack in his

departure, while he was getting on stores and hunting up ammunition, which the general of division not only failed to supply, but he refused to give an order for ammunition at Paducah, intended for a regiment *without arms*. But Colonel Worthington got it.

By his prompt arrival the colonel of the 46th had prevented the pressure into the rebel service of perhaps a thousand Union men, and had added hundreds to fill up the deficient Union regiments. Instead of approbation for the result of his prompt obedience to a peremptory order, his reward was the enmity of those above him, who had failed in their duty, and an attempt at his degradation for performing his own. (See notes at the end of the chapter.)

Colonel Hicks, the brigade commander, was an old Illinois militia officer, a benevolent and brave man, but proud and obstinate, as he was ignorant of and opposed to strict military discipline. Without much education of any kind, he was boastful that in the Mexican war he had acquired, and professed, great contempt for regular officers and *army regulations*. This contempt for all military law he had carried out to the fullest extent at Paducah, refusing to subject his troops (good men as they were and of excellent material for soldiers) to any discipline whatever.

He had in consequence been held in arrest by General Smith for weeks or even months at Paducah, and his men, instead of being sent to the field, had been retained in quarters, as utterly unskilled, in consequence of their colonel's practices and principles, and therefore unfitted for campaign duty.

Under this officer, at war as he professed to be with all regular officers and with strict discipline, was the colonel of the 46th Ohio brigaded by the general of division, *with a purpose of his own*, and anything but friendly to the older graduate. When visiting his pickets at Paducah, near those of Colonel Hicks, he had found it the practice of these vig-

ilant watchers of *the Illinois*, to gather in squads, of two or three or more, around a fire, on or off the picket line, then and there to stack arms, by driving their bayonets into the "bloodless sheath" of the muddy soil, and pass the time at seven-up, poker, or some such absorbing game of cards, and all with their colonel's entire approbation—sometimes perhaps a looker-on himself.

On reporting this in a quiet way to the brigade commander, he told his subordinate a long story of his experience with the stiff and stately regulars, tyrannizing over the innocent recreations of their men, of whom they should have been like him, *even as it were a father to his troops, as he was*. As to amending the habits of the sentinels, "*it was hard to teach an old dog new tricks.*" On representing the case to General Sherman he agreed with Colonel Hicks, and concluded to let matters proceed in the regularly irregular militia routine, or no routine at all.

So the West Point man had to give it up, &c., &c., forbidding his own men on pain of imminent death or disgrace, if ever in danger, from indulging on picket duty in such agreeable but dangerous and most unmilitary practices; and it was by such practices that many regiments were surprised, posts lost, and thousands of men killed and captured in the early period of the war. But to return to the brigade commander at Savannah. He had on arrival landed on the west side of the river, thus dividing his brigade. On the morning of the 12th, the adjutant of the 46th reported this fact, and stated that, the yawl of the Adams being gone, he could not get his morning report over the river. He was told to send a copy of the report to the A. A. G. of the division, and get the report over as soon as he could get a boat. There was no forage to be had in the country for the teams, and the colonel of 46th having purchased a lot of corn in the husk, was busily getting it on board, supposing, of course, the expedition would not stop short of Florence, where feed for teams

would be still more difficult of supply, and therefore he left the care of his report to the adjutant.

At 1 p. m. Colonel Hicks had the colonel of the 46th arrested for failing to send over his report. Stating the case to Sherman, he got a release at 5 p. m., with a letter from Hicks, in which he was assured the arrest had been fully approved by Sherman, who knew that no one but General C. F. Smith could legally make an arrest. This, however, exposed his *animus* toward Colonel Worthington of the 46th, who was reported at home as degraded for misconduct and neglect of duty, in preceding the army without orders. The object of brigading him under such an enemy of regular officers as Colonel Hicks had been attained, and soon after Hicks was displaced for the appointment of another brigade commander, also with a personal object on the part of Sherman, as will appear in the course of this treatise; which, let it here be remembered, will not be cumbered with any more such personalities, if possible to be avoided.

We have now the Army of the Tennessee at Savannah, instead of at Florence; the reason of stopping short of which place will be developed hereafter, so far as present information can lead to such development.

The division commander thus vented his rage at the early arrival of the 46th Ohio at Savannah, on those of its sick men his negligence or inhumanity had failed to provide for at Paducah, and this after having snubbed its commander for being late at that place, necessary to repair his neglect in not giving orders to his colonels to take on additional stores for such an expedition and *leave their sick behind*.

[Extract from the Diary of an Officer of the Army of the Tennessee.]

“SAVANNAH, TENNESSEE, TUESDAY, March 12, 1872.

“A lot of sick men were lodged for the day in a house near the river bank, owned by a Confederate officer named Martin, with leave of his brother to use it and his own leave, through Mr. Cherry. Martin's wife I had seen in the morning, who made no objection to the use of

the house, which was destitute of any furniture, and did not tell me there was anything to be injured, as I understood there was not. Being in a room above stairs about sunset, I heard that she was complaining that mischief had been done. I went down and told the sick men to go to the boat. Going out, I found Mrs. Martin complaining to General Sherman, who asked me angrily what the men were doing in the house. I said they were sick men, put in the house by permission of its owner, while the boat was being cleaned out. He answered that it was an outrage to put men in a house where there were a parcel of women, and ordered some soldiers of a Missouri regiment to turn the men out. The sick were going as fast as their strength would permit. I clutched his arm and requested him to be quiet, as I had ordered the men out, and he saw that they were going out. He repeated his order to *clear them out* very violently, and in the most silly and brutal manner; but no one seemed disposed to obey an order to commit violence upon sick men, thus barbarously brought up from Paducah, instead of being sent home, both as a matter of humanity and economy."

On the 13th March, 1862, an order having been received by the 5th Division to proceed up the river next day, the following testimonial of good conduct was presented to the colonel of the 46th Ohio by Mr. Cherry:

"SAVANNAH, TENNESSEE, March 12, 1862.

"The undersigned, citizens of Savannah, Tennessee, and vicinity, hereby declare that the presence of the 46th Ohio volunteer regiment, on the 8th instant, proved most opportune in preventing the arresting and pressing into service of persons subject to the draft or detail ordered by the State authorities. Refuge was thereby afforded to those who had to leave home on account of the draft, and in preventing many of them from being pressed into the rebel army, and adding a considerable number of recruits to the Union army. The troops under Colonel Worthington have been quiet and orderly, committing no trespass or intrusion on our citizens or their property. That they were actively engaged as scouts and pickets, is proven by their capture of a number of the rebel cavalry. Information of hostile operations was sedulously sought for, and active measures taken for their suppression by the officers in command. And we further declare that the opportune arrival of said regiment here gave great satisfaction to our community, and by their efficiency and good conduct they merit our thanks and approval, as they will doubtless receive that of the national government and all true friends of the Union. W. H. Cherry, H. Stephens, J. S. Berry, B. Hinkle, George L. Morrow, Donald Campbell, H. H. Brogues, J. N. Kindel, J. N. Herring, C. W. Morris, Bert S. Russell, B. B. Alexander, J. I. Trist, D. T. Street, T. N. Caldwell, T. G. Lee, R. T. Picket, John H. Maxwell, John Williams, E. Walker, W. N. Maxwell, Wm. Russell, John W. Eccles, J. D. Donahue, C. C. Franks, Thos. Maxwell, J. S. Winton, W. W. Thurston, Robt. Meader, W. D. Booth, T. L. Puckett, D. D. Crook, T. F. Frazier, **R. H. Russell.**"

unteers bravely and surely delivered in that moment of terror and of blood.

Far away on the banks of the Tennessee the fallen heroes of that brave attack lay almost unnoticed and unknown, and as some trifling token of remembrance for the service of the dead and the living to the Union, and from their commander for the more than entire justice they have done him for his action that day, he has from the first wished to have struck a medal of honor, with some appropriate device or design, with the name of each volunteer embossed upon its face, showing whether he was killed or wounded, and present at the first fire of the regiment, at noon, April 6, 1862. And for this purpose he had a correct list of those present made out immediately after the battle; the number being 556 or 560. He has not so far been able to obtain the means due him from the government for his civil service in 1861 to strike such medals, which will not cost to exceed one dollar each.

He, therefore, respectfully requests of the Ohio Legislature that he may be authorized to contract for the dies for such a medal, and the medals, not to exceed five hundred and fifty six (556), to be paid for by and deposited with the Adjutant-General of Ohio, to be delivered to the volunteers of that regiment on proof of identity, if living, or to their representatives, if dead, unless it may be considered that the medals of those killed in battle or who have since died may be more appropriately held for exhibition at the capitol of Ohio.

Very respectfully submitted,

T. WORTHINGTON.
Late Colonel 46th O. V. I.

WASHINGTON, *March 18, 1879.*

CHAPTER III.

EASTPORT EXPEDITION.

"Sherman, on the 14th March, went to Tyler's Landing, whence the 6th Ohio marched to Burnsville, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, some miles east of Corinth, which was destroyed, and returned *unmolested to Savannah.*" (*Hon. H. Greeley.*)

"On the 14th of March, Sherman, with the leading division of Grant's army, passed up the Tennessee on transports, and, after making a feint of landing at Eastport, dropped down the stream and disembarked at Pittsburgh landing." (All on the 14th.) (*Bowman & Irving's Sherman and his Campaigns.*)

"General C. F. Smith pushed forward troops to Eastport, on the Tennessee, but ultimately took Pittsburgh landing as the initial point." (*E. D. Mansfield's Lives of Grant and Colfax.*)

"C. F. Smith took command of the expedition, and while the captain of Donelson remained in disgrace at Fort Henry, the troops were pushed forward as far as Eastport, on the Tennessee. The operations, however, were without results, and Smith returned to Pittsburgh landing, on the western bank of the Tennessee." (*Badeau's History of Grant.*)

By the above the honor of this Eastport affair seems to remain easy as between the claims of Smith and Sherman to the same, while Grant is entirely accessory, and was, perhaps, more than so in reality, though Smith bears the blame. Now, there may be many inferences deduced from the above-cited quotations by the admirers of these two rebellion-risen commanders. Inseparable in the origin and cause of their success as the twin brothers of the old Dorian mythology, though which is the pugilist and which the cavalier their admirers may take their own time and way to determine. (Both are of the ring.)

From this category of admirers may, perhaps, be excluded that most benevolent and impracticable political philosopher and too practical utilitarian sage, Greeley, never satisfied without the evolution of results from causes. In such earnest and laudable research he has found it

essential to tell, in order that actions may have results, that Sherman went to Tyler's landing, whence the 6th Ohio (under the general's command, of course) marched to Burnsville, some miles out of Corinth, which (Burnsville or Corinth?) was destroyed, and returned unmolested to Savannah. It is difficult to distinguish as to the merit of these wonderful performances, if accomplished; but it seems plain that the 6th Ohio should have the palm, not as to the imaginary destruction of Burnsville or Corinth, &c., but, being at the time (March 14th) at Nashville, Tennessee, its march must, if made, have far exceeded in celerity that of Nero, the consul, (not the fiddling firebrand,) from Venusia to the Metaurus.

There seems, at the same time, little or no disposition on the part of Sherman's admirer, Bowman, to impute that merit to his patron which, according to Badeau and Sherman, properly belongs to C. F. Smith, the real hero of Fort Donelson, if there was one. The fast friend (Fidus Achates) and uncertain eulogist of the President is clearly entitled to the merits, and still more clearly to the demerits, of this wonderful, dangerous, and mysterious expedition, comparable only to that of Jason, to Colchis after the Golden Fleece—time out of mind.

This expedition is, or was, as brilliant, according to Greeley, as it is terrible, according to Draper. If we are to believe this most erudite, critical, and most veracious historian, Sherman lost many men and horses in the swollen streams, striving to reach the Memphis and Charleston railroad. If any men and horses were really lost, their record has been kept more quiet than that of the three horses which were *not* killed under Sherman at Shiloh, unless, like the knight of old, he killed them to prevent their captivity by the enemy.

The venerable Mansfield makes the Eastport honor uncertain, but drops the matter as provocative of inquiry by curious readers.

The true history of this affair, so studiously covered up by Badeau and Bowman, is taken from the diary of an officer who was an actor in this worse than useless expedition which was most fortunately arrested, as it might plainly have produced the most ruinous results to the troops engaged in it—though a gain with that cost—if Sherman, its instigator, could thereby have been set aside for a more worthy commander at Shiloh.

“SAVANNAH, TENNESSEE, *March 14, 1862.*

“About 1 P. M. Sherman's troops left on an expedition to Mississippi, and tied up a few miles below Eastport. Rain last night and rain all day after 12 M. We were to have left for the interior at midnight, but about 11 P. M. had orders that the start was postponed till 2 A. M., (15th,) the river rising six or eight inches an hour, and filling a bayou or thoroughfare next the hill, which will be impassable long before noon to-morrow.

“*Saturday, March 15, 1862.*—Up at half-past 12; raining, as it had been all night. The expedition had been ordered, with two days' cooked provisions, to march out and break up the Memphis and Charleston railroad, and return,—a useless job, unless we can effect a lodgment, which does not seem intended. Started in the rain about 3 A. M., though, from the rising water, it was plain we would soon have to return. Went out about three or four miles, over a road impracticable for artillery without repair, and were there stopped by a creek backed up from the river and several feet deep upon the road. My regiment having charge of the artillery, I went back and reported to Sherman, who ordered a return about 7 or 8 A. M. At the bayou found the 54th Ohio zouaves, Colonel Smith, wading back breast-deep.

“A very silly expedition under the circumstances, and adding hundreds of weakly men to the sick list.”

The high water was fortunate, as had we got a few miles farther toward the railroad, the division would have been captured, as the rebels were in force about Iuka, and A. S. Johnson was just passing his troops over the route from Decatur to Corinth, expecting the occupation of Florence every hour of every day after the capture of Fort Henry, up to the time he concentrated with Bragg and Beauregard, about the 20th of March, 1862. (W. P. G.)

This Eastport affair demands attention, on account of the endeavor, by imputing it to Smith or dropping it entirely, to conceal a characteristic blunder of Sherman's in the opening of the campaign, which was repeated by him

whenever an opportunity offered throughout the war. It was the blunders, and nothing else but blunders, and far worse, at Shiloh, which have given him his present position, and blunders alone characterized him in the advance on Savannah, Tennessee, as improvident, reckless, violent, and unjust, while his advance on Savannah, Georgia, earns for him the reputation of the "Attila of the age." It took all day of the 15th to get the troops and artillery on board the fleet. Left soon after midnight, and on the morning of Sunday, the 16th, the boats tied up at Pittsburgh, which also deserves attention, as this first landing of troops at Pittsburgh is imputed by Grant to *C. F. Smith*.

NOTE.—This most extraordinary and indeed insane movement could not be accounted for by the writer till he found ample evidence that it was intended to cover Halleck's avoidance of the occupation of Florence for personal purposes. It would not have been undertaken had there been any probability of its success. Time will doubtless develop that these operations of Halleck's had their origin in Washington, having several purposes—one to supplant McClellan, one to prolong the war, and beyond this to put Halleck, Grant, and Sherman into the positions they attained, at the sacrifice of hundreds of millions and myriads of lives. Treacheries—not blunders.

CHAPTER IV.

INTO CAMP SHILOH.

"A small stream that rises in the field in front flowed to the north along my whole front. (This faces the division to the west. T. W.) I saw that the enemy designed to pass my left flank, and fall upon Generals McClemand and Prentiss, whose line of camps was almost parallel with the Tennessee River, and about two miles back from it." (*Sherman's Report of Shiloh.*) (The Tennessee running due north at Shiloh.)

These divisions are also faced east or west, and are in a line parallel with Sherman's division, exposing their flanks to the attack from the south, (see plate 2,) which was about an equivalent arrangement to that which existed. (T. W.)

Sherman's 5th division went into camp three miles out from Pittsburgh landing, on the 18th and 19th of March,

and Hurlbut's division (the 4th) from half a mile to a mile out about the same time, and to the right and left of the Corinth road, with little or no order whatever. C. F. Smith's and McClemand's divisions came out from the 20th to the 22d of March. Smith's, the 2d division, was scattered along the upper Purdy road from half a mile to a mile or over, out west from Pittsburgh landing.

McClemand's (1st) division was encamped in better order and on better ground than any other. His left was a little east of the main Corinth road, about four hundred yards nearly due north from Sherman's centre at Shiloh church, and bending a little back or eastward from the centre to the right or north; the ground was, in general, wooded on the east of this camp, with open ground on the west, which was a good arrangement for defense, so far as it went.

Its general direction made an angle of about seventy degrees toward the northwest, with the direction of Sherman's line at its centre. Sherman's statement of his centre as being at Shiloh church is about the only correct statement in that report, except, perhaps, his account of his wanton destruction of a battery of his own artillery, and his desertion of what organized troops he had left at the most dangerous hour of the day, 10 o'clock A. M., as he specifies, but only one brigade, not two, as he says. (9 A. M.)

Badeau's map of Shiloh, corrected both by Grant and Sherman, has his (Sherman's) centre far east of the Corinth road; while the official map, corrected by the same authorities, puts the same centre five hundred yards or more west of the Corinth road, so that both maps contradict the division report and each other. Badeau's map refuses, or throws back the right or 1st brigade of Sherman's, which was the reverse of fact. This map also throws the 1st brigade across the Purdy road, where it was not, but where one of its regiments should have been.

The two extreme right regiments of the army lay di-

rectly along the lower Purdy road, which passed between the field and staff quarters on one side and the company quarters on the other. Sherman's division was on a line concave, instead of convex, to the front.

It is most probably arranged convex on the map to produce the impression that Sherman's centre, behind which he had his headquarters, was the most advanced part of the line, as it *was* southwest towards Corinth, but not southward.

The camp of General B. M. Prentiss, established ten or twelve days before the battle under General Grant's immediate direction, was located with its right over a mile from the left of Sherman. Its centre was in latitude near a quarter of a mile south of Shiloh church, or a little south of east from Sherman's centre. It had seven regiments scattered without order along a distance of half its proper front, which would have been over three-quarters of a mile.

On Badeau's map a third brigade, which is a fiction, is thrown in to fill up the vacaney. The left of Prentiss was in nearly a north and south line with the right of Stuart's (2d) brigade of Sherman's (5th) division, and was about eighty rods south of Stuart, whose three regiments were dumped down anywhere, near a mile from the *Hamburgh* ford of Lick Creek, half a mile from its mouth at the river.

It has been asserted, according to Whitelaw Reid and others, as an excuse for so exposing and detaching this brigade, that as Buell's troops were to be posted at Hamburgh, two miles above on the river, the exposure would cease when this posting should occur. Now, Buell's advance division reached Savannah, eight miles below Pittsburgh, before noon of the 5th. The same afternoon the rebel army was concentrated westwardly, at and from the southeast bend of Lick Creek. This bend is about a mile northwest of Hamburgh, on the river, and the same distance nearly due south of Stuart and Prentiss, making the right of the enemy a little over a mile from the river at

Hamburgh, according to Badeau's map. So that, if the intention of posting Buell at Hamburgh had been carried out, the rebel army might have been attacked at 4 p. m. (5th) or after, on its right and rear, by Buell, and on its front by our army of 40,000 men, at Shiloh. Its capture and dispersion would have been inevitable. But, if done, this would have been done by Buell's troops, and was not in accordance with the views of Grant, Sherman, and Halleck, in the field, nor the Committee on the Conduct of the War, &c., at Washington. This digression will be repeated whenever opportunity offers to show how and why the Union troops at Shiloh were slaughtered for personal purposes, after their betrayal into security, for purely or impurely political objects, by direction of those in power.*

After which digression return is made to the camp. Grant and Sherman, to make the front look respectable, have posted the right of Prentiss half a mile nearer Shiloh than it was, while the brigade of Stuart, the only body of troops placed anywhere near right on the front, is separated from the left of Prentiss by a gap of half a mile, which did not exist, so as to close the gap towards Shiloh.

To cover this fictitious gap there is very cunningly placed a body of troops which was not there till after the battle.

The very worst fictional feature of this map of Grant's and Sherman's is the poking in of McClerland's left flank between Sherman and Prentiss, over half a mile east from its true position. This is an attempt to close up on paper a gap of over a mile, which did really exist in fact, and which Sherman swears *did not exist* at all, and *did exist*, for Buell's troops, which were to be sent to Hamburgh, as they would have been sent, were it not necessary, as he says, to have had a "Shiloh" trial of pluck. So they were left at Savannah, were Buell's troops. This gap was a bait; the bait

* The war was cultivated as old hunters cultivate she-wolves, for wolf-scalps for the sum of so much a head or scalp.

took, and took with it 13,000 Union soldiers on the 6th and 7th of April, 1862.

The gap was not only the key-point, but the wide, open highway to the flanks and rear of the Union line; and this is the key Grant says Sherman held into the inside of the line, if line that can be called, without military connection; without connecting roads, front, flank, or rear; without proper guards; without defenses, for fear they would invite an attack; without anything especial but the gaps, like the intervals between herds of buffaloes scattered over the western plains, if buffaloes do scatter at all, even when out of danger. The least broken ground on this battle-field of about ten square miles, except that of McClemand's 1st division, was the line of this front, of about two and a half to three miles from Stuart's left to the extreme right of Sherman's 1st brigade. This extreme right rested on a height one hundred and twenty rods north of Owl Creek. There was a rivulet, with swampy borders, between the left regiment, the 53d Ohio, which separated it about two hundred yards from the 57th, on its right. Over this swamp there was no causeway or connection with the centre, but by the high land in the rear. The ground on this line being unbroken by ravines, was easily defensible from infantry, and no line ever more required defenses than did this line of Sherman's three right brigades, and defenses sufficient could have been made by all the troops in an hour. Located on the upland, bordering a creek fifty to one hundred and fifty yards in front, with a wooded, bushy border, the line was approachable and was approached within half-musket shot by an enemy remaining almost entirely unseen. Beyond the creek, four hundred to six hundred yards in front, was a range of low hills, commanding the camp, and forty to sixty feet or more above its level, which level was thirty to forty feet above the creek bottom immediately in front. The left might have been so located as to be completely protected by the

Tennessee River, but it was so posted as to be turned easily, as it was turned soon after the attack on the 6th. On the extreme right, Owl Creek might have been used to strengthen that flank, but it was left as a mask for a hostile approach. Had this right flank been attacked, as was Sidney Johnson's intent, by even a single brigade, at the same time with the left, and held its ground no better than the 53d Ohio, under Sherman's immediate direction, the destruction of the Union army before noon would have been inevitable.

The same result would have occurred at or about noon, had our right been turned by the rebel flanking force, which for several hours was repelled by the 1st brigade of the 5th division, which brigade was detached under the charge of Sherman's aides, and, deserted by them *and him*, was left unsupported and alone, far on the extreme right and front of the Union line of battle. (See Sherman's report.)

Such as is above imperfectly described, was the battle-field of Shiloh, selected by Sherman with demoniac sagacity and approved by Grant, before the troops went into camp on the 18th and subsequent days of March, 1862—chosen with as much anxious and personally-interested sagacity as marked the patriotic purpose of the great German liberator Arminius (Hermann) in choosing among the forests of the Lippe (Det mold now) that battle-field for the destruction of Várus and his legions, denominated, as one part of it is, the “mord kessel” (“*death pot*”) to the present day.

To fix the day of our being ordered into camp, the following diary extracts may be of interest:

“PITTSBURG LANDING, March 18, 1862.

“Went to Sherman's boat, the *Continental*, for orders, and was told to get everything off the boat of the 46th Ohio at once, and to the camp about three miles out near Shiloh church. During the night the 3d Iowa and 81st Ohio had completely clogged the road, which they did not clear for the teams of the 46th till near 2 P. M. By night the teams were worn out and had to stop. There seems no order or

regularity about anything. Every volunteer regiment is allowed to dump its camp down anywhere and in everybody's way."

"WEDNESDAY, *March 19, 1862.*

"A damp morning, after rain during the night. At 8.30 A. M. saw Sherman on the Hannibal, and reported that the road was clogged by the —— regiment and would soon be impassable. Without waiting for my suggestion that the road should be left open or I could not get out, he said very brusquely that he could not act on my mere *ipse dixit*; that his engineer had examined and reported on the road. (He had no engineer.) I then suggested that one thousand men on the road towards the proposed camp could put it in passable order in a few hours, and requested that I might be myself permitted to repair the road. He said he would do nothing with it to-day, but might to-morrow. (Nothing, however, was done.) Rode out to the camp about noon, stepped off the ground for the ten companies, and had my own tent pitched about sunset."

REPORT

OF THE

FLANK MARCH TO JOIN ON McCLERNAND'S RIGHT,

At 9 A. M.,

AND

OPERATIONS OF THE 46TH REG'T OHIO VOL'S.,

1ST BRIGADE, 5TH DIVISION,

ON THE EXTREME UNION RIGHT,

At SHILOH, APRIL 6, 1862.

“Into the jaws of death,—into the mouth of hell,
Charged the six hundred.”

COL. WORTHINGTON, COMMANDING.

WASHINGTON, D. C.
1880.

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REPORT

Of the flank march to join on McClelland's right, and operations of the 46th Regiment Ohio Volunteers, 1st Brigade, 5th Division, at Shiloh, April 6, 1862; Colonel Worthington, commanding.

This brigade consisted of the 6th Iowa, Colonel John Adair McDowell, commanding the brigade, on the right; 40th Illinois, Colonel Stephen Hicks, on the left; and the 46th Ohio, Colonel T. Worthington, in the centre.

It was posted fronting south-southeast, nearly half a mile east of the Owl-Creek Bridge, on the lower Purdy road, on high ground, above the bed of an affluent of Owl Creek, whose general direction from Shiloh Church was about northwest. The pickets of the 46th having been driven in at or about 7 A. M. on the 5th, the colonel was, as indeed he had been for over two weeks, on the alert, with two companies sleeping on their arms, several days before the attack.

Just after sunrise on the 6th April, being out with the pickets about half a mile from camp, he first observed the enemy by the glitter of their arms, marching to attack the division centre at Shiloh Church, and the regiment was immediately thrown forward to the brow of the creek bottom in front, which was covered with heavy timber and dense underbrush.

TIME OF THE FIRST ATTACK AT SHILOH.

The attack commenced on the 3d and 4th brigades, on the left and right of the log church, about 7 A. M., and the roar and rattle of artillery and small arms for two hours on our left, across the bend of the valley, was not calculated to stimulate the courage of raw troops, never yet under fire, and neglected by their division commander.

A little after 9 A. M. came an order from General Sherman by his aid, Major Sanger, to fall back about two hundred yards to the lower Purdy road, passing through the centre and out to the right of the camp of the 46th Ohio northwestwardly.

RETREAT OF THE 1st BRIGADE BY THE LEFT FLANK AT 9 A. M.

Before the regiment was established on the road came an order to retreat by the left flank so as to join on McClelland's right, then with his division warmly engaged with the enemy, who had swept off our two centre brigades on the right of, and the 1st brigade and Prentiss' division on the left of, the Union front near the river.

The colonel of the 46th, having reason to believe that the rebel left must be near and in rear of our right, and would soon attack the camp, gave to Lieutenant-Colonel Walcut the momentary direction of the 46th until he should rejoin it, and then rode rapidly along the front of the company tents and back by the rear, calling out for sick men and lingerers to leave the camp. He found his orderly (Louis Bowman) "*watching*," as he said, the ammunition. He ordered him instantly to retreat, but he was captured a few minutes afterwards.

Shortly before the first order to retreat (9 A. M.), the colonel had directed an acting wagon-master to ride down the ravine in rear of the camp and observe if the enemy were near Owl-Creek Bridge, less than half a mile northwest of the camp of the 1st brigade.

After leaving the camp, and while galloping across an old field, the colonel attracted the fire of the pursuing rebel line, which wounded several men of Captain Wiseman's company ("C"). On reaching the right of the brigade, halted in the woods about four hundred (400) yards northeast of the camp, he found, to his surprise and satisfaction, the

46TH POSTED ON THE EXTREME RIGHT
of the 1st brigade, the 6th Iowa having been transferred to
the left, with the 40th Illinois still in the centre.

About the time he reached the brigade, his acting wagon-master came up on foot and reported that when at the outlet of the ravine, some two hundred (200) yards from Owl-Creek Bridge, he saw rebel infantry approaching, and a body of their cavalry which had just crossed the bridge, several of whom dashed towards him, when he dismounted and took to the underbrush, barely escaping capture, about which he was ordered to keep silent; the safest course, the colonel considered, being to keep the troops ignorant of the extremity of their danger.

The troops of the 46th Ohio were at least restive, in consequence, perhaps, of being so suddenly thrown out of position in the brigade, and by knowing by the heavy fire in our front that they were dangerously separated from the Union line, besides being in the most exposed position on the field.

Starts back, by squads or platoons, were occasional, and the adjutant once repeated what he said he thought an order from the left to retreat, little knowing our immediate peril in the rear.

FUGITIVES FROM THE LEFT ANNOUNCE THE DISPERSION OF SIX
CENTRE REGIMENTS, 5TH DIVISION.

The arrival of thirty or forty fugitives with Colonel Cockerill, 70th Ohio, from Buckland's brigade, giving fearful accounts of the dispersion of the six centre regiments (4,000 men), was by no means encouraging to the troops of the 46th, from which the brigade commander and division staff seemed to keep cautiously away.

To quiet the men, the colonel rode along his front, and, quietly calling the company officers together, assured them that their surest safety from imminent destruction was to

keep quiet in line, while he would ride out *alone* towards the battle-field, and soon return to report the coadition of affairs in front.

TO QUIET THE TROOPS, THE COLONEL MAKES A RECONNAISSANCE
TO THE FRONT IN FACE OF THE ENEMY.

Captain Heath, company "A," being the only one he advised of the extreme danger of the brigade, and to look out for an attack on our rear and right flank.

He rode out accordingly across a wooded ravine, where were several dead and wounded men, to old fields beyond, over which part of our left centre had just retreated, having left broken-down gun carriages, baggage wagons, and several dead men and horses; while the firing on our extreme left seemed to recede, having doubtless been the driving back of Prentiss' division and Stuart's troops, 1st brigade, 5th division, near the river.

He returned in perhaps twenty-five minutes, and soon after, about 10 A. M., the brigade was moved by the left flank, and after a very deliberate march of nearly a mile from its camp northeastwardly, the right of the 46th came west of and about half a mile or over from the flanks of the contending armies.

1ST BRIGADE DISORGANIZED AND 46TH OHIO DESERTED IN THE
FACE OF DESTRUCTION BY BRIGADE AND DIVISION
COMMANDERS, AT 11½ A. M.

Here the brigade was halted, and faced to the front or right in line, for perhaps half an hour, on cleared and broken ground on the edge of a thick wood to the east. During the halt the 40th Illinois was detached from the centre, and at about 11.30 A. M. the 46th was ordered to march forward towards the battle ground in front, or eastwardly towards the Tennessee River. With the 40th Illinois went the brigade commander, Colonel McDowell, 6th Iowa, and his own and the division staff, leaving the other two regi-

ments, thus separated and out of sight of each other, to march forward over unknown ground, without guides, scouts, or skirmishers in front or on the flanks, they (the staff, &c.) having had ample reason to expect an immediate attack on our right flank.

THE WARNING AT NOON BY CAPT. HEATH.

The march thus ordered was continued four or five hundred yards over brushy, wooded, and broken ground, while shells occasionally exploded or balls cut the branches of the trees above the imperilled troops. The 46th, on the extreme right of the Union line, emerging from the wooded ravines, had just passed a small stream nearly parallel to its front, into an open wood, with rising ground on its front and right. The colonel having just passed, as he had frequently before, along the rear of the regiment, was perhaps twenty yards from his right flank, when Captain Heath, company "A," suddenly stooped to his left behind his right files, and silently beckoned the colonel forward. When near, Heath warned him in an undertone that the "greys" were gathering *thick as bees* over a ravine on our immediate right.

At a glance the colonel observed indistinctly through the brushy woods several regiments, as it seemed to him, advancing down the slope on his right, while not over sixty yards just across the ravine was a hostile line, (whose subsequent fire proved it equal to his regimental front,) at a kneel and ready to fire.

To retreat or fight instantly was a necessity, with scarce an instant for the consideration of results, which had nevertheless to be considered. To have come to the right-about, or to have filed by the left in retreat, would have inevitably and instantly drawn the hostile fire. He knew by the distant fire on our extreme left that it had fallen back nearly a mile towards the landing, and to retreat without an effort was to expose the Union line on his left to an immediate

flank attack, with results more or less fatal to the success of the Union arms that day.

An attempt to change front and gain a fire would, if a failure, be but the loss of a few more men than by a retreat; and, desperate and hopeless as seemed the chances, he instantly determined on the attempt to change front and gain the fire.

THE CHANGE OF FRONT IN FACE OF THE ENEMY AT A READY
TO FIRE.

The right of the 46th had passed the hostile left perhaps ten or more yards, and to avoid both the oblique and front fire on his right, the colonel ordered Captain Heath to throw his company into line obliquely and about ten yards to the right and front, against an oak on the edge of the stream just passed.

To have attempted to change front by the prescribed and preliminary half-wheel would, as the event proved, have given the enemy time enough to open fire, to our certain destruction; and he therefore ordered the more instant movement by the "rifle drill," so inconsiderately omitted in the then and now existing tactics (Hardee's and Upton's), the commands being "Front forward on first company;" "right face—double-quick—march," adding outside the drill and yelling, "Squat, boys! squat! — you, squat for your lives as you get into line."

THE ATTACK OF FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTY ON TWENTY-FIVE
HUNDRED MEN.

Fortunately, not a man in the regiment save Captain Heath and his first-sergeant (King) were aware of the terrible danger and death so close at hand; and the troops went round the more rapidly from supposing that the movement was intended to avoid the fire at the crest of the slope to which they were about to be exposed.

The colonel dashed to the left to perfect the change of

front, before the men were down, and as he rose in his stirrups to command the fire was himself fired on by a squad of sharp-shooters to the right and rear of the Confederate line, just at the time his fire, then delivered, was returned within not over a second of time.

This gain of a second, however, disconcerted their fire, and their immediate retreat followed our fire—a fire the more fatal from the descent of their ground towards the Union line, which had nearly a hundred men killed, wounded, or grazed.

THE FLIGHT OF THE FORTY-SIXTH.

The 46th, before he could give an order, rose and also broke in disorder to the rear. The colonel's horse had been shot clean through the withers without injury to the bone; but having a shot also above the left knee, was so crippled that even if the colonel could have got him across the broken ground on the line of retreat his order to halt, while in the rear of the regiment, would have been useless. He therefore rode off to the right or east of the flying line to the crest of the ridge, then to the left or north until even with the foremost fugitives, and to the left or west again, along a bridle-path, into their midst.

THE FALL OF THE COLONEL'S HORSE AND THE RALLY.

When about the centre of the flying line his exhausted horse came suddenly to his knees, throwing his rider a length or more over his head among the startled men, who were, perhaps, rallied more in consequence of this fortunate mishap than by his loud and expletive orders to fall in line on peril of immediate death or capture. Then, by the aid of Lieutenant-Colonel Walcut, Major Smith, Adjutant Neil, and Captains Heath, Alexander, Geary, Wiseman, Lilly, Pinney, and others, with Sergeant-Major Foster on the left, in less than three minutes the regiment was in line and in action, leading the hostile flanking force, as he found

afterwards, to suppose that the whole 5th division was then in their front.

Sending out a few trusty scouts, the colonel soon found that the enemy was attempting the turning of his right flank by crossing over the ground lately passed over by the 1st brigade, and accordingly kept up, as well as to his front and left, a fire in their direction on the right, which was so vigorously returned that the cutting of the twigs of the brush where we were was repeatedly perceptible.

THE 6TH IOWA ATTACKS THE ENEMY.

Meantime the 6th Iowa, on our left, had been so intent on the battle raging on the left that the change of front and fire of the 46th was not noticed, and advancing nearly to the open ground west-southwest of McCleernand's camp, this excellent regiment, though without field officers, changed front southward and opened an effective fire on the enemy still pressing our extreme right, and lost more men in proportion to their numbers, and indeed actually, than any other regiment that day in the Union Army of the Tennessee at Shiloh, the 46th perhaps excepted.

The fortunate retreat of the 46th for about four hundred yards had placed the regiment on high and advantageous ground, but nearly the same distance from the right of the 6th Iowa. So, apprehending danger from this gap in the line, the 46th, while continuing its fire, was gradually closed on to the right of that regiment about 1 p. m., and with severe loss maintained the position until near or after 2 p. m., when an order came through Major Hammond, A. A. G., to fall back and rally in rear of the 11th Iowa, near the centre of McCleernand's camp.

THE RETREAT IN DISORDER OF THE UNION RIGHT WING JUST BEFORE GENERAL JOHNSON'S FALL.

About the same time McCleernand's whole front had been driven back or northwardly, crossing the retreat of

the 1st brigade nearly at right angles in flight, so that the troops became mixed in the utmost confusion.

Therefore, on Colonel Worthington reporting to General Sherman, he considered an attempt at a rally impracticable, and ordered the colonel of the 46th to report to General Grant the condition of affairs on the Union right, and meantime to attach any fragments of his regiment to the nearest body of organized troops, which was done accordingly.

THE COLONEL OF THE FORTY-SIXTH FINDS GRANT AT DINNER
ON HIS BOAT ABOUT 3 P. M.

About 3 p. m. the colonel reported to General Grant on his boat, the *Tigress*, at the lower landing, and by him was ordered to ride out and report to the troops that General Lew Wallace, 3d division, would be up in half an hour with ten thousand men. On reaching the brow of the hill the colonel was surprised to find General Buell, who told him his advance would, he thought, be up in an hour, and riding out he first reported to McClelland's division, on the right of the Corinth road.

The announcement of aid was cheered along the whole line not then in action. He then rode off to the left, through Hurlburt's deserted camp, and observed a body of rebel cavalry, several hundred yards in front, about to advance.

THE COLONEL OF THE FORTY-SIXTH PREVENTS THE CAPTURE
OF M'ALLISTER'S BATTERY.

He passed off, therefore, to the right, where he found McAllister's Illinois battery, inactive, as he said, for want of gunners or orders, and exposed to immediate capture. Riding instantly over to General McClelland he reported the circumstances to him, and he, with some of his staff, immediately rode over and brought in the battery, which did good service the same afternoon. He then rode over the woods and bottoms of Snake Creek, where thousands of

men were lurking under the ravine banks to avoid the fire; also down the creek to the river bank and back repeatedly to the battle-field.

ARRIVAL OF NELSON AND AMMEN AT 5 P. M.

About 5 p. m. thousands of our men were ready to join in Buell's attack with troops then arriving; and near sunset Colonel W. reported to General Grant, who was on foot, and had just been directing the posting of the rallied men and newly-arrived troops. The General ordered him to return to the battle-line and keep the troops up to the front in the last attack, which continued until night closed the conflict for the day.

CONCLUSION.

No troops could have behaved more effectively than did those of the 46th Ohio in such an extremity. 1st-Sergeant Burr, of Pinney's company, an excellent and most worthy young soldier, was killed, with many others, at the first fire. Captain Geary, company "B," of Franklin county, Ohio, and Lieutenant Wilson, of Licking county, Ohio, were killed in the 2 p. m. retreat, with Sergeant Hassan, of Fairfield county, and Lieutenant-Colonel Waleut, after we had rejoined the 6th Iowa, received a flesh-wound in the upper left arm. From Lieutenant Upton, of Colonel McDowell's staff, the colonel has heard that it was the opinion of General Sherman that his first brigade prevented, by its steadiness, the defeat of the whole Union line at noon of April 6th, 1862, and the men and officers of the regiment are therefore recommended to the favorable attention of the Government.

Respectfully submitted to the Secretary of War, with a map showing the flank march of the first brigade and the condition of the battle on the Union right about noon of April 6th, 1862.

T. WORTHINGTON,
Late Colonel 46th Ohio.

WASHINGTON, April, 1879.

In March, 1879, in hope of obtaining some recognition of the service of the 46th Ohio at Savannah, Shiloh, and La Fayette, Tennessee, Col. W. submitted a memorial, with the following:

Remarks on the march at 9 a. m. and operations of the 46th Ohio Volunteers at "Shiloh," April 6, 1862, at and after noon. Being a Supplement to Colonel Worthington's report.

TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF OHIO:

The particulars of this march, with the enemy in greatly superior force on its front, right, and rear, are detailed in a copy of the official report (now in the War Department) herewith submitted, to which the colonel begs leave to make an addition (which military etiquette would not permit in an official report) in behalf of the 46th Ohio, the troops of which have done more than justice to their colonel; but, though utterly unnoticed by his three superior commanders, McDowell, Sherman, and Grant, neither the colonel of that regiment nor any historian has found or can find language sufficiently expressive to do them the justice they merit, for to do so is simply impossible.

In scaling a parapet, or storming a breach or battery, or charging a hostile line of bayonets, troops intended for such danger have nerved themselves for the encounter, and are prepared for and see the work before them. But when a single regiment of less than six hundred raw troops, deserted by their three highest commanders and left alone where shot and shell are crashing and exploding and cutting down the forest above and around them, are thrown instantly into the face of immediate and unexpected destruction, as was the 46th Ohio, it is cause for the utmost wonder and admiration that instead of breaking back, as was the wont that day, in terror and disorder when thrown instantly by a change of front into the veriest jaws of destruction, the line went rapidly round without the waver-

ing or shrinking of a single soldier, when even the cowardice of a single man, the purposed or accidental discharge of a single musket, would have consigned the regiment, the army, and possibly the Union to inevitable ruin.

When the colonel, as stated in his report, on finding a superior force within sixty yards in ambush on his right, with fingers on their triggers, at a kneel and a ready, and as a desperate and almost hopeless chance of preventing the capture or dispersion of the regiment and the army, ordered a change of front without notice to the troops of the death so many were about to meet without a thought of danger on their right, he had no more idea that the regiment could or would perfect the manœuvre successfully than that they would reach the moon; and though the result proved its possibility, his main and indeed only hope was a retreat without a previous fire ignobly in their rear, without chance of its return or hope of success.

But, as above stated, the change of front was perfected without a waver in the line, silently, surely, and without disorder, and, according to the brigade commander's report, the first most deadly fire was gained by a second of time, and from the nature of the ground it was the most fatal fire that bloody day delivered,* as proven by the immediate retreat of twenty-five hundred of the enemy on whom it fell, and two hours of time was thus gained, which proved sufficient by the subsequent death of General Albert Sidney Johnson to enable the Army of the Ohio to arrive to the rescue; and, had the pension of a general been granted to each man of the 46th Ohio from that day forward, it would have been the entirest trifle compared with the ruin averted by that single fire of 556 Ohio vol-

* Since writing the above, the colonel of the 46th Ohio has found that the advance of the flanking force was Cleburn's brigade, which went into action with 2,750 men. Had perhaps 2,500 when attacked by the 46th, and lost 1,043 killed and wounded, including 65 missing, or about double in proportion to any brigade in the rebel army.

unteers bravely and surely delivered in that moment of terror and of blood.

Far away on the banks of the Tennessee the fallen heroes of that brave attack lay almost unnoticed and unknown, and as some trifling token of remembrance for the service of the dead and the living to the Union, and from their commander for the more than entire justice they have done him for his action that day, he has from the first wished to have struck a medal of honor, with some appropriate device or design, with the name of each volunteer embossed upon its face, showing whether he was killed or wounded, and present at the first fire of the regiment, at noon, April 6, 1862. And for this purpose he had a correct list of those present made out immediately after the battle; the number being 556 or 560. He has not so far been able to obtain the means due him from the government for his civil service in 1861 to strike such medals, which will not cost to exceed one dollar each.

He, therefore, respectfully requests of the Ohio Legislature that he may be authorized to contract for the dies for such a medal, and the medals, not to exceed five hundred and fifty six (556), to be paid for by and deposited with the Adjutant-General of Ohio, to be delivered to the volunteers of that regiment on proof of identity, if living, or to their representatives, if dead, unless it may be considered that the medals of those killed in battle or who have since died may be more appropriately held for exhibition at the capitol of Ohio.

Very respectfully submitted,

T. WORTHINGTON,

Late Colonel 46th O. V. I.

WASHINGTON, *March 18, 1879.*

On the 29th of April, 1862, the 5th division with Halleck's army of invasion was ordered towards Corinth. On the 30th Colonel Worthington was the first to fortify his front, more for the purpose of keeping the men from idleness and to get them their daily ration of whisky allowed by Halleck when on fatigue duty.

The example of the 46th was soon followed by the whole army, much to Halleck's annoyance, though the resulting lines of fortifications, seven or eight in number, are all he has to show for this march of one-half a mile a day, usually denominated the siege of Corinth, which place the 46th Ohio, with the 5th division, entered about the 1st of June, 1862.

About the 10th, at Chewalla, ten miles west of Corinth, the 46th was left behind to escort a wagon train to Grand Junction.

On the 25th of June, while the division was in camp at La Fayette, Tennessee, the Confederates, by obstructing the track, threw off and captured a railroad train bound east from Memphis with several hundred volunteer troops on the way to rejoin their regiments.

Meantime, from the time General Halleck reached Shiloh, April 13, 1862, Colonel W. had vainly attempted to have instituted an inquiry into the criminality which had produced the slaughter and disgrace of Shiloh. Halleck having refused to interfere, the colonel of the 46th had urged it upon his Congressman, the Ohio Senators Wade and John Sherman; Senator Wilson, chief of the Senate Military Committee; the War Department, and Senator Wade, chief of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. Receiving no answer, he at last wrote to the Hon. V. B. Horton, of Ohio, urging him to have an inquiry made by the

Committee on the Conduct of the War, and about the 18th of June was answered as follows:

"WASHINGTON, June 6, 1862.

"DEAR SIR: Your letter of May 23 came to hand. I saw Mr. Wade, as you requested. It is a delicate matter for any one connected with the legislative department of government to *interfere with the military details*, and I doubt whether Mr. Wade will think it *judicious* to do anything. Whatever is done in regard to inquiries, will have to be accomplished, I think, through the regular military channels.

"Yours truly,

"V. B. HORTON."

It was then plain to him that there was a power of some description at Washington, by which the architects of defeat and slaughter at Shiloh enjoyed perhaps something even more than impunity.

Stimulated by this consideration, Colonel W. determined to obtain an arrest and trial without any material transgression of martial law. At night of the day on which the railroad train had been captured, about 9 p. m., the division was ordered to march at daylight next morning backwards towards Moscow, eight miles east, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Deeming this a fair opportunity to provoke Sherman, and being in the right for the reason that several Union families in the vicinity relied for security upon the advance of the Union troops towards Memphis, Colonel W. wrote a respectful remonstrance against the retrograde movement, which would seem to have been occasioned by the rebel raid upon the railroad train on the 25th June, 1862.

This he dispatched to General W. T. Sherman by Lieutenant-Colonel Walcut and Captain Heath, company A.

In a few minutes they returned, Walcut seeming rather disturbed and Heath amused by the result, which was, that General Sherman was, of course, very angry at such insubordination, and returned for answer that if Colonel W. sent any more such notes he would be arrested. On which Colonel W. remarked that an arrest was his object, and

dispatched the two officers so as to be ready to march, as ordered, at daylight.

Ten minutes after they left, Colonel W. received the following:

[Special Order No. 101.]

HEAD-QUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,
ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE.

LAFAYETTE, TENN., June 25, 1862.

The 52d Indiana volunteers will move early in the morning to the bridge three miles west of this place and form a junction with the 56th Ohio volunteers, the senior officer taking command of both regiments. These regiments will guard the bridges and road to Germantown, and draw their supplies from Memphis.

Colonel McDowell, commanding 2d brigade, will detail the 46th Ohio volunteers to remain and, with one section of artillery detached by Major Taylor, protect the depot in Lafayette and the bridges and railroad.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman.

J. H. HAMMOND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

P. S.—The railroad having been broken to-day, and an attack being imminent, great vigilance must be exercised.

J. H. HAMMOND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

With the same pen used in writing this order General Sherman wrote another directing these regiments, 52d Iowa and 56th Ohio, without Colonel W.'s knowledge, to Memphis, and next morning, about 10 A. M., he became aware that the 46th, as at Shiloh, was deserted. Several of the pickets also having come in with warnings from planters that the post would be attacked within twenty-four hours, and Major Hammond having (unknown to Sherman) given warning by the postscript, Col. W. having taken care of his intrenching tools, had the post so fortified during the night as to be able, with 300 men fit for duty, to repel 2,000.

Otherwise he doubtless would have been attacked and perhaps captured, as was a large Union detachment at Murfreesboro the 13th July, 1862.

The general of division (as was understood) intimated insubordination on the part of the colonel for this fortification without orders.

He also refused him ten horsemen to keep a lookout for Col. Jackson and Major Porter, who, ten or twelve miles off, on Coldwater, had 800 men, which on occasion could be doubled.

For want of cavalry scouts to give warning of the danger, these Confederates on Coldwater did attack his pickets about the 1st of July, one of whom, J. M. Harper, a boy of eighteen, was killed.

The "*animus*" so often as above indicated was exemplified by twice brigading Col. W. under volunteer officers without military knowledge or capacity, though he had been for many years general of Ohio militia; had graduated high (sixth in engineering) at West Point thirty-five years before, and commanded the best-instructed regiment in the division, or perhaps in the army, as proven at Shiloh, where his military education availed the government more than the expenses of West Point for centuries. Yet he was retained under the same command after the battle, and the brigade commander to whose position and responsibility he had been transferred at the most critical and dangerous period of the conflict on April 6, 1862, was recommended by Sherman and Grant for promotion, as hereinbefore stated, while Col. W. was ignoriniously and illegally dismissed the service for the performance of the highest moral duty incumbent on a gentleman, a citizen, and a soldier. That duty, so far as his circumstances will permit, is perfected by this "*Memoir*," which will be found as correct as another regarding the same events has been found truthless.

And the above exposition may be considered as in some sort the conclusion of the defense he was not permitted time to make at Memphis in 1862, though not all exhaustive of the subject. And if the colonel of the 46th Ohio, by a moderate and judicious use of stimulants, &c., had done no other service than obtaining through a court-martial the official and historical information herein recorded,

the same should have been not only in mitigation of his having remained under the influence of liquor to the extent charged during the whole campaign of 1862, but should have been worthy to some extent of the promotion and emolument accorded to others for his meritorious conduct in this behalf, outside the battle of Shiloh; and for the service performed, by a method so unexampled in military history, he trusts he may at least be exculpated from groundless charges, through which he has been consigned to poverty and obloquy through nearly twenty years of his old age.

July 16, 1862, Colonel Worthington was ordered by General Sherman to join his brigade, which would be at Lafayette the 17th July, 1862. The brigade arrived, and the command of the post devolved on the chief of the brigade, Colonel McDowell, 6th Iowa volunteers.

On the 18th, about 8 A. M., the 46th marched out of the fort, and Colonel Worthington was congratulated on his escape from capture by the construction of the fort, and joined freely in convivialities common on such occasions with the officers of the division. He was consequently afterwards charged with drunkenness on duty as commander of the post, when at Memphis, the 10th of August following, on the occasion of his having had printed for the information of General Halleck sundry extracts of his diary running from the 20th March to the 5th of April, 1862. On the 9th a copy of these extracts was handed to Sherman by Captain H. H. Giesy, of the 46th, and he was at once appointed major in anticipation of Colonel Worthington's dismissal by a court-martial ordered on the 12th.

The action of this court may be gathered from papers herewith published; and on the 16th of September Colonel Worthington's command of the 46th Ohio ceased by General Sherman's order approving the sentence of the court cashiering him for "*drunkenness on duty*" and "*conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman*."

T. WORTHINGTON.

APPENDIX.

A list of Officers, non-commissioned Officers, and Privates belonging to the 46th Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry who were present at the first fire, battle of Shiloh, 6th of April, 1862, at noon.

COMPANY A.

Captain J. W. Heath.	Private A. J. Freshour.
Lieutenant H. Michael.	J. M. Harper.
Sergeant Amasa King.	Christ. Holzer.
W. C. Davis.	John Heppard.
James M. Donathan.	A. D. Johnson.
E. C. Heath.	A. Johnson.
Corporal E. Thomas.	E. D. Keopple.
Wm. Lytle.	A. Krough.
J. M. Archer.	W. H. H. King.
A. H. Brown.	J. S. Linsey.
S. F. Ross.	L. Sennigon.
Private J. Allen.	Joseph Sine.
M. Agler.	J. Lehman.
W. Agler.	J. Mortimore.
S. Brown.	S. B. Mortimore.
A. B. Brown.	J. H. Moore.
J. Boroff.	Wm. Moore.
J. Book.	Thomas McGlaughlin.
H. Bryant.	N. Rousch.
H. Billman.	A. Ricketts.
G. Custer.	P. Siler.
Wm. Custer.	S. B. Smith.
G. Counterman.	W. E. Sill.
A. Argham.	A. M. Truby.
D. P. Dunathan.	J. W. Tullis.
Wm. Dickensheets.	D. Wollet.
G. Donafon.	Ailer Williams.
T. J. Freshour.	D. H. Wolf.

COMPANY B.

Captain A. G. Sharp.	Corporal N. C. Stiles.
Lieutenant J. Lohrer.	A. S. Baker.
George Crary.	Sol Cassidy.
Sergeant M. B. Wright.	Geo. M. Carter.
T. Belford.	U. G. Beatty.
C. G. Prentiss.	Private O. A. Booker.
J. P. Williams.	H. Cross.
Corporal L. P. Kammerer.	John Cramer.

Private J. E. Copeland.
 C. Cable.
 J. S. A. Calwell.
 W. Dixon.
 P. Dondel.
 W. Evans.
 C. Fortenbasher.
 G. W. Funks.
 Jas. Gabrill.
 Sam Heaston.
 W. U. Hoover.
 A. A. Hatfield.
 G. Hill.
 C. Huddle.
 Ben Hunter.
 H. Heller.
 H. Hofricker.
 S. Hanawalt.
 L. B. Kile.
 John Kurtz.
 M. Katzel.
 F. Kopp.
 O. R. Mansfield.

Private A. M. Mansfield.
 J. McKinney.
 E. McKinney.
 H. Nichelbach.
 E. Rhyne.
 John Rinks.
 John A. Swank.
 Davy Smith.
 A. A. Sheridan.
 Theo. Smiley.
 S. R. Snoffer.
 W. Shiere.
 Jas. South.
 G. W. Shipman.
 I. Smith.
 John N. Wallace.
 C. Wallace.
 E. N. Williams.
 John Walker.
 E. Wilson.
 Geo. Webb.
 Sam Yerger.

 COMPANY C mislaid.

COMPANY D.

Captain H. C. Geary.
Lieutenant Ed. N. Upton.
 Jos. Mellen.
Sergeant Lucius Windle.
 Wm. R. Steele.
 Wm. S. Dalton.
 Geo. Knodever.
 John Lilley.
Corporal A. C. Brown.
 Geo. Frankenburg.
 J. V. M. Smith.
 M. Holland.
 Henry Morris.
 J. B. Hendley.
 John Calvert.
Private Christ. Angle.
 Joseph Baker.
 Adrian L. Bancroft.
 Charles H. Bancroft.
 Geo. D. Bancroft.
 Jos. Bell.
 Andrew Bell.
 Christian Betzs.
 Enoch Brittingham.
 Francis Brittingham.
 Allen Boyd.
 James Butler.
 Geo. Bear.

Private Wm. Brown.
 John Cassiday.
 Alfred Clemens.
 Francis Drummonds.
 Robert Davis.
 Wm. Fisher.
 James Fielding.
 Simon Fought.
 Moses Guant.
 Edward Garrett.
 Joseph Garrett.
 George Galloway.
 George Geary.
 Daniel Gantz.
 Eli Golden.
 Louis Harmon.
 John Hafey.
 Wm. Henipy.
 Joseph Herner.
 Wm. Hess.
 Eli Howell.
 Morris Horn.
 John Hendrickson.
 John Humphries.
 Samuel Hunter.
 Joseph Hinckle.
 Frederick Jamison.
 Wm. Joshua.

Private Wm. Jowitt.
 Martin Kanarny.
 Edward Lewis.
 John Lewis.
 Allen McUtchen.
 Henry McUtchen.
 Anthony McGill.
 Charles Miller.
 John Osborn.
 George Pfalzgraf.
 John Parkinson.
 John Senior.

Private Jacob Shilling.
 Andrew Sheridan.
 Daniel V. Smith.
 Daniel O. Smith.
 Francis Smith.
 Daniel South.
 Jacob Schock.
 Wm. Ward.
 Jas. White.
 Charles Wheeler.
 _____ Washborne.
 Samuel Zimmerman.

 COMPANY E mislaid.

COMPANY F.

Captain H. H. Giesy.
 1st Lieutenant J. J. Carran.
 Sergeant J. H. Brandt.
 J. Smith.
 B. F. Hassan.
 S. Groves.
 H. H. Brooke.
 Corporal Eli Swartz.
 S. Stoltz.
 J. B. Young.
 W. H. Myers.
 D. H. Swartz.
 E. Moyer.
 Perry M. Bopre.
 Private Wm. Bennett.
 George Brock.
 N. Beverly.
 John Broyles.
 G. Brown.
 W. A. Camp.
 Jno. Carroll.
 J. M. Cherry.
 J. H. Cly.
 G. Cook.
 J. Cook.
 J. Campbell.
 R. Curphy.
 P. Dougherty.
 S. D. Evans.
 N. Fellows.
 J. W. Fields.
 T. J. Gilbert.
 G. Griesly.
 N. T. Hill.
 S. H. Hopkins.

Private E. Hyer.
 F. H. Johnson.
 J. H. Kyner.
 T. McKiernan.
 J. McDanno.
 W. Myer.
 N. Naw.
 G. Olipp.
 J. Oldham.
 J. Orily.
 D. H. O'Neal.
 H. W. Proctor.
 Wm. M. Richards.
 J. S. Root.
 J. Ritter.
 S. Roby.
 Wm. M. Swartz.
 H. Swartz.
 J. Swartz.
 W. Stewart.
 J. A. Solidy.
 C. Seaman.
 T. Sanborne.
 T. Sessler.
 D. Shelter.
 J. N. Shedran.
 J. R. Sturgeon.
 J. M. Stevenson.
 S. Terry.
 W. J. Wietner.
 B. F. Winchester.
 A. D. Westhoven.
 Tho. Williamson.
 C. Zooke.

COMPANY G.

Captain P. A. Crow.	Private Peter McKiever.
Lieutenant H. B. Wilson.	John A. Moore.
Sergeant D. Stewart.	Asa McCammack.
H. G. Johnson	Dallas Merchant.
Jasper Smith.	Bruce Murry.
J. B. Phinney.	Joseph Mullin.
Waldo Davis.	Levi Millington.
Corporal A. Blane.	Otis Millington.
C. Fisk.	Samuel Millington.
A. Mullin.	John A. McFall.
Wm. W. Miller.	Wm. Patterson.
Thos. Higginbottom.	John G. Paul.
Private John Burton.	William Perry.
Edward Buckley.	David Riley.
Josiah Bethard.	Joshua Robinson.
James Barnes.	Thomas Rice.
William Butler.	Samuel Rees.
James Clawson.	George Stiner.
David Cain.	Richard Spindler.
Joseph Campbell.	Alden Smith.
John Evans.	Joseph R. Smith.
Herman Fish.	James Smith.
Omsions Festis.	Philip Sutton.
Gilbert Falls.	Wm. Skates.
Elisha Hunt.	Wm. Sherman.
Thomas Herst.	Thomas A. Stids.
Crittendon Hatley.	Erasmus Tucker.
Francis M. Hatley.	Theodore Woodruff.
Thomas Jamison.	Joseph Wright.
William James.	Levi Wagner.
John King.	Elisha Wood.
Rufus Ketner.	

COMPANY H.

Captain Mitchel C. Lilley.	Private Theodore F. Cook.
1st Lieutenant Thos. C. Platt.	Ammon P. Converse.
2d Lieutenant John Ramsey.	Harry Davis.
Sergeant Andrew W. McConnell.	Luke Davis.
Michael A. Lilley.	George M. Davis.
Joseph Amos.	David J. Davis.
A. B. Wood.	John Engl.
Corporal Geo. Gowan.	James Cochenour.
John Riemensnyder.	Manikin J. Gibbons.
Joseph Alexander.	John Ganger.
James E. Gowans.	Wm. M. Harris.
Private Howard G. Affleck.	John Hays.
Neely Alexander.	Michael Ham.
James Angel.	Cornelius Kelleher.
Bruce W. Beall.	Patrick Kelly.
Jefferson Bickett.	Alfred Koch.
Madison Bradford.	Horace Latimer.
Bruce E. Brown.	Benedict Levy.
Henry C. Church.	Robert M. Lilley.
James M. Church.	Louis Loftland.

Private Martin Meyers.

Abraham McDonald.
Henry C. McCracken.
Wm. McMullen.
William H. Newland.
Samuel Richards.
John Riley.
John D. Reed.

Private Martin Regner.

William Sayn.
John Schenf.
James A. Shaw.
Wilson P. Smith.
William H. Taylor.
John C. Timmans.

COMPANY I.

Captain Chas. L. LyBrand.

1st Lieutenant Chas. C. Movers.

2d Lieutenant John H. Valentine.

Sergeant William H. McGinnis.

John H. Valentine.
Joseph Crain.
William Nash.
John Tabler.

Corporal Joseph Fisher.

William Thatcher.
Adam More.
Noah Duncan.
James Highlands.
Lorenzo Staley.

Private John S. Atwater.

Fred'k Bechtel.
James Bodel.
George H. Bethard.
Henry Benton.
John Brown.
Jackson Crowell.
Wilbert Clayton.
John W. Clemson.
Jonathan Dent.
Thomas Ekenis.
Noah Fisher.
Charles Fisher.
James Fairman.

Private Joshua Gipe.

Henry C. Gallchey.
George Hess.
Eli Hatfield.
Jethro Hall.
Thomas W. Hurt.
Geo. Hufford.
James Holmes.
James Hook.
Alexander Jeremiah.
John A. Moore.
Jonas Meciling.
William Maxson.
John Mullen.
George W. McClain.
Adam Moat.
Andrew J. Nolan.
John Phail.
George Prime.
Henry Plummer.
David M. Pence.
John Reid.
John Staley.
Aaron Sherman.
William Suddith.
Jacob Stepleton.
William B. Weyer.
Henry Waterman.

COMPANY K.

Captain Isaac N. Alexander.

Lieutenant C. C. Mooers.
A. L. Parks.

Sergeant Melancthon Hughes.

Philip B. Glenn.
John W. Penn.
Paul Traup.

Corporal Caleb Roberts.

Zeman H. Smith.
Jackson Balding.
William Hening.

Private John Atchison.

William O. Bodle.
Archibald Castel.

Private James Clary.

Michael Conlon.
Patrick Conlon.
Cornelius Diets.
Abram Delong.
Isaac Dilbone.
Nathaniel Donefon.
John Geertler.
Benjamin Hauck.
Cyrus Hauck.
James Herrod.
Daniel Hipshire.
William Lott.
Isma Malick.

Private William B. McCabe.
 Andrew Miller.
 George Miller.
 David Morehead.
 Henry Morehead.
 Elmore VanGundy.
 Levi Moore.
 John Renssellar.
 James H. Watson.
 Leander Wentz.
 Lemuel Seniff.
 Rodolph Shendel.
 John H. Wheeler.
 Peter H. Young.
 George W. Darnel.
 Chesly Lee.
 William J. May.
 James A. McGee.
 Laborre Prince.

Private Benjamin Nowland.
 Daniel Hummell.
 John Holland.
 William J. Heathcoat.
 William H. Hollis.
 Paul W. B. Keddy.
 Alfred Risener.
 Henry _____.
 Thomas M. Galleher.
 William Zimmerman.
 John Greeves.
 William Greaves.
 Robert Ireland.
 William E. Ireland.
 Tilman Lewis.
 Nathan Lewis.
 John Miller.
 Phillip Beins.

List of killed, missing, and wounded of the 46th Ohio Infantry.

COMPANY A.

Wounded.—Privates Philip Burtes, severely; W. H. King, severely; James W. Tullis, severely; Am. Trubey, severely; George Dumfon, severely; Daric P. Dunothan, slightly; A. B. Bivion, slightly; A. Croghan, slightly; John Boraff, slightly; John Heppeaud, slightly; Joseph Murtonire, slightly; John Horner, slightly; Enoch Thomas, slightly; William Lytle, slightly; Henry Hoots, slightly.

Missing.—Privates Dahel Wallet, Ailer. Williams, Thomas McGlothin.

COMPANY B.

Killed.—Corporal Henry C. Stiles; Privates George W. Finks, Joseph South.

Wounded.—Sergeant John W. Williams, severely; Corporal George M. Carter, severely; Privates Henry Weller, severely; Owen Mansfield, severely; Elias McKinney, severely; John A. Sweuk, severely; William Shine, slightly; Charles Wallace, severely; E. Williams, severely.

Missing.—Private James F. Kibley.

COMPANY C.

Killed.—Sergeant John Rowles; Privates David Taylor, Lewis Walmire, William Guge, E. M. Shaw, and John Stewart.

Wounded.—Sergeant E. W. Pettill, severely; Corporals Thomas Baston, slightly, William Noble, M. Lechner, and James Carine, severely; Privates David Busulf and Devill Culp, severely; D. S. Evans, slightly; Geo. Harrison, Jacob Hare, A. G. Martin, Miles McGeown, D. M. Noe, George Parkinson, Frank Smith, and James Thompson, severely; George Wise and R. M. Yontz, slightly; William Yontz, severely.

Missing.—Privates Owen Hill, William Sneider, J. W. Hanson, Mothen Wyckoff, and A. F. Wise.

COMPANY D.

Killed.—Captain H. H. Geary; Privates George Bear and James White.

Wounded.—Corporal George Frankenburgh, slightly; Privates A. McGill and D. O. Smith, slightly; Jacob Shilling, mortally.

Missing.—Sergeant Wm. S. Dalton; Privates Andrew L. Bancroft, James Blair, William Hempty, Jacob Heartman, L. Zimmerman, Andrew Sheredon, Christ. Angle.

COMPANY E.

Killed.—Sergeant H. C. Burr, Privates Joel Stuttle and Eli Baker.

Wounded.—Lieutenant W. W. Watts, severely; Privates J. Brentmyer, severely; Alexander Coon, severely; H. Boswell, severely; B. Clark, severely; H. Fellows, severely; William Jones, severely; H. Shuttle, severely; William Wallinbayer, severely; William Thomas, slightly; Edward Lebring, slightly; William Hines, slightly; J. Andur, slightly; T. Fryer, slightly; J. Muslin, slightly; C. Skeels, slightly; A. Wright, slightly.

Missing.—Privates Charles Constock, T. Coats, J. Brown, Cal. Hayes.

COMPANY F.

Killed.—Sergeant Benjamin F. Hasson; Corporal Eli Swartz; Privates Nicholas Nan, Jerome W. Fields, and H. W. Proctor.

Wounded.—Privates Silas Roby, mortally; James Kyner, Christian Zools, Daniel Shelter, Joseph Cherry, John Broyls, Thomas McKierman, John Oriley, John Kitter, John Stephenson, Thomas Williams, John Carroll, and Dennis O'Neil,

severely; First Lieutenant John Carran, severely; Privates Benjamin Winchester and George Presly, slightly.

Missing.—Privates B. F. Gontz, William Bennett, Jacob N. Cly, John Cook, Francis Johnson, John McDonough, Dennis O'Neil, Paulmas Massey.

COMPANY G.

Killed.—Lieutenant Hiram B. Wilson; Privates Dallas Merchant, Theodore Woodruff, Levi Millington, and Samuel Millington.

Wounded.—Corporal Thomas Tansy; Privates Richard Spindler, E. Wood, Joseph Campbell, John G. Paul, Asa McCammack, Phillip Sutton, John King, Joseph T. Barnes, Joseph Clossin, and David Cam.

Missing.—Privates Lewis Bowman, James Baker, Henry Farman, Jacob Kissel, Elisha A. Hunt, Thomas Hearst, Thomas Jamieson, Jesse Milen, Samuel Rees, Joshua Robinson, Joseph Wright, and John Herron.

COMPANY II.

Killed.—Privates James M. Church, Wilson P. Smith, M. J. Gibbons, Martin Regner, Bruce E. Brown.

Wounded.—Lieutenant John Ramsey, slightly; Sergeants A. A. McConnell, severely; Michael A. Sibley, severely; Joseph Amos, severely; Corporal Joseph Alexander, severely; Privates H. G. Afflict, severely; John Hays, severely; M. Ham, severely; Alfred Koch, severely; W. H. Newland, severely; Benedict Leary, severely; John D. Read, slightly; William Swayne, severely; Samuel Richards, severely; Corporals James E. Gowans, slightly; Theodore F. Cook, slightly; Martin Meyers, slightly.

Missing.—Corporals John Engle, Peter Hughes.

COMPANY I.

Killed.—Privates John Brown, Alexander Jeremob.

Wounded.—Corporal Joseph Fishey, slightly; Privates John Atwater, seriously; George H. Bethard, seriously; Jackson Crowell, seriously; Adam Mont, seriously; John Stales, seriously; Jetho Hall, seriously; Joshua Gipe, slightly; Henry Waterman, slightly.

Missing.—Privates William Suddith, Andrew Noland, Eli Hatfield, Elijah Hastings.

COMPANY K.

Killed.—Sergeant Phillip B. Glen; Private William Dermston.

Wounded.—Corporals Caleb Roberts, slightly; John W. Holston, slightly; Jackson Balding, severely; Privates Isaac Dilbone, severely; N. Donfon, severely; John Greaves, severely; Tilman Lewis, severely; William E. Ireland, severely; Robert Ireland, severely; Nathan Lewis, severely; John T. McCollough, severely; John Miller, severely; James H. Watson, severely; George H. Danel, slightly; John Gressler, slightly; Abram Delving, slightly; Patrick Conlin, slightly; Danel Hyshire, slightly; William Heathcoate, severely; William H. Hollis, severely; Alfred Risner, severely; Henry Weaver, severely; Thomas M. Galleher, severely; William Zimmerman, severely; D. Hepshire, slightly; W. O. Bodle, severely.

Missing.—Privates Bernard Balding, Archibald Casteel, Lemuel Swift, Otho Fox, William Greaves.

BRIEF RECORD OF COLONEL WORTHINGTON'S SERVICE DURING THE CIVIL WAR.

The Hon. C. C. Carpenter, Second Comptroller, having decided that if anything is due Col. Worthington for army supplies at Camp Dennison, Ohio, in 1861, it would be upon the principle that a man who has rendered his country a valuable service as a soldier, when in reduced circumstances deserves a consideration, &c. This decision may authorize a statement of the services which are the main cause of such circumstances, besides his service in the Mexican War.

In April, 1861, after enrolling a company of volunteers on the 15th, and calling meetings by printed bills over the whole county, he proceeded to Cincinnati, on his way to Washington, where he had been promised the aid of Gen. Scott (afterward given in 1863) for his advancement in the army.

He was detained by an urgent request from the citizens

to publish a manual of Infantry Tactics, as there were none then to be had. No publisher being willing to run the risk, he published one, as the duty of a West Point graduate educated by the government for such emergencies, costing but one-third that of the official copies.

While attending to the publication of the manual, he detected a grave omission as to the only mode of rapidly changing the front of a line in presence of an enemy. So far as the 46th Ohio was concerned, this omission was corrected, and the 46th was the only regiment on the field of Shiloh that could have so manœuvered as to have held, as it did hold, the extreme right of the Union line long enough to make advancing aid available. By this detention at Cincinnati he was accidentally involved in a contract for the water supply of Camp Dennison. By this undertaking he prevented an expense to the government of more than \$20,000, but lost his opportunity at Washington, besides incurring a debt which in part is yet unpaid.

Being in Washington at the time of the first battle of Bull Run, he offered a regiment to the War Department. This he recruited and organized, and March 6, 1862, was one of five Ohio regiments at Paducah ordered to report forthwith to Gen. C. F. Smith, at Savannah, Tennessee. The 46th Ohio was the only regiment that promptly executed the order, reaching Savannah on the 8th of March, in time to prevent a draft of perhaps one thousand citizens by the Confederates, of which two or three hundred joined the Union army.

At the battle of Shiloh the 46th Ohio was, without notice, transferred from the centre to the right of the first brigade, being thus placed on the extreme right of the Union line, far detached from the main army. Its right being suddenly threatened, by a prompt change of front, as above stated, the 46th attacked and repelled a superior flanking force till ordered back, about 2 p. m., April 6, 1862.

The 46th being a part of Gen. Sherman's division, that

officer obtained credit for a service to which has been imputed the rescue of two great Union armies from imminent destruction, and to which service is due his past promotion and present position.

More than a week before the attack, the colonel of the 46th warned both of his immediate commanders of impending danger, urging the immediate fortification of the position.

Not being able to get tools through the division commander, he obtained them at his own expense, but not until the evening before the battle. For these tools he has since been paid, on the approval of Gen. Grant.

He was the first officer who fortified his position on the march to Corinth, his example having been followed by the whole Union army. In June, 1862, on detached service with about three hundred men, at Lafayette, Tenn., and warned of an imminent attack by a fourfold force, he constructed the only closed field-work by the army up to July, 1862, and thereby prevented the attack and probable capture of his position. For the above and other special service he obtained no promotion. The payment of over \$20,000, proven due by official authorities for the water supply of Camp Dennison, 1861, has been withheld, and he now requests such a position on the retired list as may in some measure be a requital for his military service, and the balance due him by the government, on official evidence.

And he requests, more especially in justice to the 46th Ohio volunteers, that the facts as to their prompt advance to Savannah, Tennessee, and their efficient operations on the extreme Union right at Shiloh, may have that official recognition hitherto denied.

Respectfully submitted,

T. WORTHINGTON,
Late Col. 46th Regt. O. V. I.

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1878.

As a matter of interest, perhaps, to the 46th Ohio only, the following poetical articles, out of many published by their Colonel during the war, are appended to this very imperfect history of the regiment.

T. W.

AN ODE ON THE FALL OF FORT SUMPTER.

BY GENERAL T. WORTHINGTON.

An Old Friend and School-mate of Major Anderson.

Shame, shame to thee, land of the brave!

The long-boasted land of the free;

Thy glory is stained by a traitorous glaive,—

How wretched thy portion may be!

“Derision shall strike thee forlorn,

And mockery that never shall die,

The curses of hate and the hisses of scorn

Shall burden the winds of the sky.”

If the freedom we vaunted of yore,

The flag our fathers unfurled,

Goes down by the hand of a traitor before

The scorn of a wondering world,—

Shall the Eagle of Liberty fall

By a shaft which is plumed from his wing,

Our freedom and glory and power and all,

All perish by treachery’s sting?

Where, where hath the exile a home

When that flag is a refuge no more?

Wide over the earth and the ocean to roam,

Or a dungeon or death, as of yore,

Shall then be his desolate doom.

If that flag is not floated again

From that earth and that ocean dispelling the gloom

Created by tyranny’s chain.

[But gratitude, glory to him

Who nobly that flag has maintained;

False friends, traitor foemen, uniting to dim

His honor forever unstained.

While time shall record how undaunted he stood,

Defending that flag amid death-shot and flame,

All mem’ries that cherish the brave and the good

Shall cluster round ANDERSON’S name.]

Lost, lost is the Freedom our forefathers won,

And Arnold no traitor is now!

That treason of treasons but yesterday done

Hath covered his treason with snow.

Weep, weep o'er the tenantless tomb!
 Where erst the young Andre has lain!
 Weep, weep that his sacrifice shrouded the gloom
 Of Freedom's betrayal again!

"Oh, where is the spirit of yore,—
 The spirit that breathed in thy dead
 When Liberty's star was the beacon before
 And Honor the passion that led?"
 Haste, haste ye to Washington's tomb,
 And scatter its dust on the wave,
 Which beareth its waters, in sadness and gloom,
 Toward the land of the Traitor and Slave!

Low, low lies that Flag of the Free!
 Which, never polluted before,
 No longer is sacred or worthy to be
 A Patriot's Flag, as of yore—
 Unless with that dust ye shall fly,
 Avenging the stain it has borne!
 Determined to plant it again, or to die
 On the rampart from whence it was torn!

Ye sons of the Elbe and Oder and Rhine,
 Where, where is your asylum now,
 If the spirit of freedom no longer divine
 Shall die by a traitorous blow?
 Up! up to the rescue, like Hermann of old,
 And scatter the legions afar,
 Which traitors, by patient endurance grown bold,
 Have gathered by rapine for war.

Shall the shores of the Danube grow pale,
 And sadder the stream of the Po,
 At the downfall of freedom, and Liberty's wail
 Be echoed by Switzerland's snow?
 Up! up with the spirit of Tell
 From the grave where so long he hath lain,
 That with it each patriot bosom shall swell
 And sweep away treachery's stain.

Go sons of green Erin, go; take
 Montgomery's ashes again
 To the Isle of the Shamrock and Shannon, or wake
 And breathe forth his spirit again
 O'er the land for whose freedom he fell;
 No longer for freedom a home,
 If treason shall triumph and anarchy's spell
 Engulf us in tyranny's doom.

But no! all around us arise
 The shades of the glorious dead!
 And Warren and Washington bend from the skies
 O'er the land where each patriot bled;
 They call us to whiten the stain
 Which o'er us a moment is thrown;
 Then up with that flag upon Sumpter again,—
 It shall waive when each traitor is down!

卷之三

THE FALLEN AT SHILOH.

Azaleas are blooming in valley and glade,
Where the martyrs of Shiloh sleep under their shade,
And their bright boughs are weeping o'er corses so pale,
Their fast-falling blooms in each sigh of the gale.

At the dawn of that morning how bravely arose
Those friends of the Union to battle its foes !
At the dusk of that evening how silent they lay
On that red field of Shiloh—woe ! woe for the day !

Who, who shall restore them, these friends of the free,
And who their relentless avengers shall be ?
On, on their brave comrades, halt never again
Till the waves of the Gulf hide the graves of the slain.

Who shall answer for Shiloh, one thousand for one,
Unworthy of tombs in the light of the sun ;
Those fell foes of freedom, oppressors, and slaves,
Let them infamous lie in their honorless graves !

But for ye who are weeping, oh 'twas not in vain
That the blood of your loved ones was shed like the rain ;
Their tombs shall be hallowed, and from them arise
The purest of incense that reaches the skies.

On Liberty's altar their best blood was given ;
Shall its voice vainly cry from the ground unto Heaven ?
No ! for each shall a thousand such heroes be borne
O'er the plains of the South to avenge, if to mourn !

T. WORTHINGTON.

CAMP OF SHILOH, APRIL 8TH, 1862.

FIRST CALL FOR 100,000 MEN.

INSCRIBED TO PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

“*Tis but one hundred thousand men.*”

“*If we can't kill you in battle,
you, we can starve you to death.*”
(*Chivalric Rebel.*)

From Madawaska's icy shore
To Rio Bravo's burning sands,
From wild and wide Atlantic's roar
To mild Pacific's golden strand,
Up, up, ye friends of freedom all
To drive the vipers from the den
Where pine our friends in famined thrall !
’Tis but one hundred thousand men !

$$\phi \in \mathcal{C}^{\infty}_{c,0}(\sum_{\alpha \in \Delta} V_{\alpha} \otimes \mathbb{C}^{\otimes k})$$

From where the Everglades spread wide
 To Minnesota's farthest wild ;
 From far Superior's icy tide
 To Pensacola's zephyrs mild,
 Grasp, freemen, grasp your brands of wrath
 And march—march fiercely forward then
 To snatch your braves from lingering death !
 'Tis but *one hundred thousand men* !

O think ye, at your groaning boards
 When August crowns the bloom of May,
 And brown November heaps his hoards
 Of plenty for your winter's day—
 Think ye of those whose fetters bind
 Their fainted frames in Treason's den,
 And can ye linger yet behind?
 'Tis but *one hundred thousand men* !

Unsatisfied where fields of blood
 Their crimson harvests daily bear,
 These traitor fiends of demon mood
 Deem not of honorable war,
 If ye are not in *battle* slain,
 By *famine* ye'll be murdered." Then,
 Forward ! they shall be free again,
 Though 'twere *ten* hundred thousand men.

Call out the States of '87.
 The first five free from slavery's stain ;
 To these the glorious boon be given
 To snatch our brave from Treason's chain.
 Ohio far Wisconsin greets !
 Calls Illinois to Michigan !
 And Indiana bravely meets
 The call with myriads of men.

January 16, 1864.

NORTHWEST.

A BALLAD OF SHILOH.

Written for the Reunion of the 46th Ohio at Van Wert, September
 9 and 10, 1879.

BY A 46TH OHIO VOLUNTEER.

Azalea buds, young April's pride,
 Bloomed o'er glade, vale, and lea
 Where Shiloh's battle-field spread wide,
 Down by the Tennessee.

Our first brigade, deserted, lone,
 Pressed o'er it's dangerous way
 To save our center, backward thrown,
 In route and disarray.

Conducted by the General's aide,
 A blind guide at the best,
 To go as all had gone before,
 And run as ran the rest.

The General certain on the march
 That we would be attacked,
 Valor's best part, discretion held,
 And bravely rearward tracked.

The 46th marched on the right,
 Not from the centre drawn,
 Till in disorder from the fight
 All on our left had flown.

It there the post of danger held,
 With foes all round and near,
 Driving our legions from the field
 In panic to the rear.

Van Wert's bold boys, upon the right,
 Had brave Heath for commander,
 And next the left were led in fight
 By valiant Alexander.

From Fairfield, Wiseman's, Gieseys's came,
 And Crow led Licking's brave,
 With Wilson, who immortal fame
 Found in a soldier's grave.

Sharpe's, Geary's, Lilley's, Pinney's men
 From Franklin, joined the war,
 Brave Geary fell in battle then,
 From home and friends afar.

He rests amidst his kindred now,
 Where an undying name
 Will, carved upon the marble, show
 A patriot's deathless fame.

On brigade guard that bloody day
 Were Lybrand's volunteers,
 But bravely mingled in the fray,
 As by their roll appears.

Fierce was the fight, and shot and shell
 Went crashing through the wood,
 Where slaughtered men and steeds that fell
 Told where our front had stood.

Two, three, four Generals rearward fled,
 And, marching all alone,
 The 46th towards danger sped,
 Its time and place unknown.

Emerging from a tangled wood
 And rough, uneven ground,
 At noon the gallant 46th
 Its field of battle found.

Our Captain beckoned to his chief,
 Who instantly drew near,
 "See the greys gathering fast," he said,
 Close on our right and rear.

Aye, there they were in easy range,
 While none but Captain Heath,
 His chief, and sergeant knew we were
 So near disgrace or death.

Aye, there they were in easy range,
 By thickets fortified,
 While we to fight our front must change,
 Or fly, who—how—decide?

Our guides were gone, no Generals near,
 All, all had fled away
 From where careered flight, death, and fear,
 And direst disarray.

“Front on the right and fire,
 File by the left and fly,
 File by the left to find disgrace,
 Front on the right to die.”

“File by the left,—our right is turned,
 Our wavering legions lost,
 Front on the right,—one chance is earned,
 One chance, whate'er the cost.”

“Front on the right and fire,
 File by the left and fly,
 File by the left to find disgrace,
 Front on the right—to die.”

Such were the thoughts like lightning flew
 Over that soldier's soul;

“Front on the right,”—his sword he drew,
 “Death is the soldier's goal.”

“Front on the right,—we'll fire,” he said;
 “Right flank—right face”—a breath,
 And fleet and fiercely round we sped
 Over that road to death.

Our front is changed, his charger slain,
 His sword waves in the air;
 “Stoop low—be ready—aim—fire!” he said,
 Our foes at a ready were.

One instant and death's leaden showers
 ‘Twixt ranks opposing sped,
 One instant more that ground was ours,
 Their ranks had fallen or fled.

That ground is theirs, which then was ours,
 Who, nobly fighting, fell
 Where the azaleas' April flowers
 Purpled lea, glade, and dell.

But deeper than their purple bloom
 Was the ground crimsoned where
 These martyred heroes met their doom,
 To sleep forever there.

Geary, Burr, Wilson, thousands there
 Won an immortal fame;
 They held their ground while we—we were
 Forced back; not ours the shame.

Thrice in an hour our front was changed
 To face surrounding foes,
 While wild and wide our camps they ranged,
 With nothing to oppose.

* * * * *
 Our Captain fought o'er Georgia's fields,
 And with McPherson fell,
 Doing his duty as he did
 On Shiloh's field so well.

Walcut, Lieutenant-Colonel, then
 Received a grievous wound,
 As did Jack Neal, our Adjutant,
 But bravely held their ground.

Our Major Smith—a Van Wert boy,
 And Major Foster, sergeant then,
 Stood bravely up at each deploy,
 Where all were bravely fighting men.

Our Generals—best the least that's said,
 THREE, 'tis known, were not where
 The brunt was borne when myriads fled
 And thousands slaughtered were.

Our Colonel—needs not here to say—
 Lives in their memories well,
 Whose lives and fame were saved that day
 Of storms of shot and shell.

His desperate chance had not been lost,
 Hopeless and desperate then,
 Two ARMIES saved, though at the cost
 Of well-nigh half his men.

And when in some far future time
 War legends shall be told,
 In stirring prose or startling rhyme,
 To listeners, young and old,

Of all who stood on Shiloh's field,
 The bloodiest of the war,
 The 46th Ohio boys
 Shall foremost stand by far.

Honored be they who stood that day,
 And tenfold honored be
 The brave who, fighting, fell and lay
 Down by the Tennessee!

Whatever they were, and whatever they are or will be,
 every soldier of the 46th Ohio at the battle of Shiloh was
 worth to the Union not less than ten millions of dollars.

GRANT AROUND THE WORLD WITH YOUNG.

PART FIVE: SECTION THREE.

As will be seen, page 77 preceding, Grant, during his trip around the world with Young, under the interested and selfish auspices of the New York *Herald*, declares General W. T. Sherman to be "not only a very accurate man, not only a great soldier, but a great man, one of the *very great* men in our country's history"; that "there is not a false line in his character. There is not a man for whose character I have a higher respect; not only one of the best men living, but one of the greatest we have in our history."

The above equally false and fulsome flatteries were doubtless suggested by the Shermans, to whom Grant is inseparably bound by complicity in equivalent criminality arising out of the conspiracy hereinbefore charged, for such selfish, base, and sinister purposes as the defeat of the Union armies at Shiloh, April 6 and 7, 1862, and second Bull Run, August 29 and 30 following.

To prove what Grant's flatteries or eulogies are worth, and the entire moral and martial depravity of W. T. Sherman, nothing more is needed than a brief analysis of some one of his reports or statements during the war, repeated, as they are, in Sherman's "*shameless memoirs*."

Time and circumstances do not here admit of a full analysis of Sherman's Shiloh report, with its scores of falsehoods and absurdities, repeated in Bowman's history, and his evidence before Colonel Worthington's court-martial, &c. In place thereof is here given a partial analysis of his

letter of January, 1865, to Professor Coppee, a West Point graduate, who has proved himself by words and pen the abject sycophant and lick-spittle of these false and entire impostors and, of necessity, mutual admirers.

More especially as this letter has been extensively quoted as a reliable and valuable acquisition to the histories of the battle of Shiloh, written by Badeau, Mansfield, and others.

The letter will be found in the "*Appendix*" to Badeau's history of Grant, page 602. It is sagaciously omitted in Sherman's history by Bowman and Irwin, as also are the three horses on Grant's evidence (not) killed under Sherman at Shiloh. The letter is, however, a fair commentary on Bowman's fulsome eulogy, page 479, when he says that "General Sherman's master qualities are of the military order." This letter to Coppee might have been quoted as proving him a *master of a high order of mendacity*.

Bowman states further that "Sherman's military estimate of men requires the most heroic proportions"—such as those of Grant, instance at Shiloh by the desertion of his left when giving up the battle as lost, and refusing aid about noon and retiring to his boat, where Buell found him at 1 P. M., and deserting his right when driven back at 2 P. M. for the same boat.

But to the Coppee letter, in which the following falsehoods can be proven by Sherman's Shiloh report, by the evidence given before Colonel Worthington's court-martial, and by McClernand's and other reliable reports as to the battle of Shiloh.

The statement following was written for the *Cincinnati Gazette* in April, 1875, and its publication declined as being an attack on General Sherman. No journalist or historian has had the honesty or moral courage to contradict those falsehoods, which, in a review of Sherman's Memoirs, the *New York Herald* stated, with other equivalent mendacities, "would largely determine many controverted points of military history," as doubtless will Young's statements

in his "*Around the World with Grant*" determine whether Grant or Albert Sidney Johnson was retreating in disorder when the Confederate commander fell at Shiloh.

1st. In this letter of January, 1865, by Sherman to Coppee, it is false that the disaster of Shiloh April 6, 1862, was NOT retrieved by the arrival of Buell's troops, and the falsehood is proven by Grant's official report, in general suppressed on account of this truth by his historians.

2d. It is false that Grant visited him while repelling the enemy with his division at 10 A. M., and so proven by the reports of Sherman and McClemand.

3d. It is false that at 10 A. M. he had command of a division, and proven as above.

4th. It is false that he was on the right of the Union line at 10 A. M. April 6, 1862; proven by Lieutenant-Colonel Upton's certificate, &c.

5th. False that he was not driven back after 4 P. M., and proven false as above.

6th. False that he repelled a cavalry attack after 4 P. M., which he says in his report was repelled by McClemand's troops.

7th. False that he was not dislodged from any position after 4 P. M. April 6, 1862.

8th. False that he had all day been expecting General L. Wallace—not ordered up till noon.

9th. Utterly false that he saw General Grant at his position near Snake Creek bridge about 5 P. M., Grant being then at the river.

10th. Virtually false that the enemy had failed to reach the landing, which Grant reports they were about to capture when Buell got up.

11th. False and absurd that at 3 or 5 P. M. any order was issued by Grant to resume the offensive on the 7th, and so proven by a subsequent statement by Sherman that there was no determination to attack before consultation with General Buell, after dark of the 6th.

12th. False that at 5 p. m. of April 6 Buell's troops had not reached Pittsburgh Landing.

13th. Proven false by Grant's report that Buell's troops took no essential part in the battle of the 6th April, 1862.

14th. False that Grant's army at 4 p. m. had successfully withstood and repelled the first day's attack.

15th. False that the Confederates were superior in number to the Union troops.

16th. False again and absurd that Sherman had orders to assume the offensive before Buell's troops were west of the Tennessee.

17th. False that he saw Buell about the time Grant was leaving him, about 5 p. m.

18th. False that at daylight on the 7th he advanced to where the battle of the 6th had been most severe. (See General L. Wallace's report.)

19th. False that he waited till near noon of the 7th before Buell's troops got up with him, and most disgraceful if true.

20th. Repeatedly false that at 4 p. m. of the 6th the Army of the Tennessee had checked the enemy; soon after as Grant reports, about to capture the landing, &c.

21st. Absurdly false that at 4 p. m. the Army of the Tennessee were preparing to assume the offensive next day, or doing anything else but retreating before the enemy.

22d. Ridiculously false that at 5 p. m. Grant expressed the opinion that if attacked at 4 p. m. the enemy would have been beaten, and most discreditable to Grant's sagacity and veracity if true.

23d. Still more ridiculously false that at 5 p. m. Grant judged that with his "*startled troops*" he would be justified in assuming the offensive next morning, and this with an army which Grant reports would have been captured but for Buell's arrival at 5 p. m. of the 6th.

24th. Crazily and nonsensically false that he received

orders to assume the offensive before he knew that Buell had reached the river.

25th. Basely false that the officers of Buell's army dwelt "too much" or "at all" on the stampede of the beaten Army of the Tennessee.

26th. Persistently, basely, and insanely false that for one whole day, "weakened by the absence of Buell's army," the Army of the Tennessee had beaten the enemy.

27th. Utterly false that Buell's army had been long or at all expected by that of the Tennessee.

28th. False beyond expression that the Army of the Tennessee had indulged in severe strictures, or at all, on Buell's slow approach, of which approach they knew nothing, much less that Sherman had tried to keep that army back till after the battle.

29th. Very meanly false that the Army of the Ohio approached slowly, having marched fifteen or twenty miles a day, while notified not to come on till after the battle.

30th. Still more meanly false that Buell's army knew anything of the danger threatening the Army of the Tennessee, which danger, on the evidence of Grant and Sherman the day before the battle, had no existence.

31st. False that this letter to Coppee corrects a *popular error*, that Buell's army prevented the capture of Grant's army, admitted by Grant himself to have been so prevented.

32d. False that any error has been committed as to Buell's rescue of the Army of the Tennessee.

33d. False that any responsible authority ever attributed the selection of Shiloh battle-field to Grant.

34th. False that it was selected by General C. F. Smith.

35th. Blunderingly false that the location of the army between two shallow creeks forced a front attack when the Union flanks were purposely exposed to attack and were turned accordingly at the moment of the attack.

36th. Still more blunderingly false that these shallow creeks at the time were any defense at all, but the reverse.

37th. False that all the divisions of the army were located by General C. F. Smith's orders.

38th. Equally false that any subordinate arrangements of the camps were made by him, unfit for duty as he was at the time.

39th. The culminating mendacity is that the false and absurd statements of this letter constitute certain *truths* which, passing out of memory, constitute what is denominated "*history*."

Such as the above is doubtless as good ground as any, and there is no better, for Grant's estimate of Sherman as the greatest, and best, and most accurate of men, without a false line in his character. If such is his opinion of Sherman, what is his opinion worth on any subject?

T. W.

PART FIVE: SECTION FOUR.

GRANT'S FALSEHOODS AS TO SHILOH.

The following false, deceptive, and contradictory statements by General Grant as to Shiloh, with many others, prove how worthless, as Sherman's, are his statements as to Sherman and the civil war:

1st. About March 30, he wrote Buell that he had 60,000 men at Savannah. Not less than 5,000 joined the army from that time up to the 6th of April, when he says he had but 33,000 men in line of battle, (besides Gen. L. Wallace with 5,000 at Crump's, four or five miles below,) making 38,000. (See Badeau, page 77.) Where were the other twenty-five or thirty thousand?

2d. On the 17th March, 1862, (see Badeau, page 68.) he says there was imminent need of Buell's support. Yet on the 30th he directs Buell's subordinates not to reach Savannah before the 7th of April, and on the 5th writes to Halleck "that there is not the least danger of an immediate attack," knowing that the Confederate line of battle

was all that day within one and a half miles of his front, at Shiloh church, and its drum-beat heard at our front.

3d. On the 5th of April he states (Badeau, page 73) that he ordered Nelson to go into camp five miles below Pittsburgh landing, and that the order was obeyed. On the 6th, his letter to Nelson (see Badeau, page 77) proves that he was still at Savannah and had not marched as stated.

4th. About 3 P. M. of the 5th he told Nelson that there was no prospect of a battle much short of Corinth, knowing, as above stated, that an attack had been for two days probable and the Confederates were within $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles of his front. Yet on the morning of the 6th, after the opening of the attack, he wrote Buell that he had expected the attack on the 7th or 8th April. (Badeau, page 75.)

5th. On the afternoon of the 5th April he also told Nelson that though he would not be expected to march before Thursday, April 10, yet if wanted boats would be sent down for him. When the attack commenced, 7 A. M. April 6th, he ordered Nelson up by land over what he considered to be a road impassable on account of high water. (See Badeau, pages 67, 73, and 75.)

6th. Knowing that his order to General Nelson to march up by land would detain him many hours from the field, and in consequence of his promise of the day before he would likely wait, as he did wait several hours, for boats, Grant states (see Badeau, page 80) that "a reason for his delay has never been assigned."

7th. In Badeau, page 78, it is stated, in accordance with the report of General L. Wallace, that he was to march up and connect with Sherman's right. This is contradicted, pages 76 and 80 of Badeau, and April 13 in a dispatch to the War Department Grant virtually charges Wallace with the defeat of the army, though plainly kept back by Grant's agency.

8th. In his report of the battle he verbosely but distinctly states that the arrival of Buell's advance prevented the

capture of the army. This he afterwards contradicts July 26, 1863, by a report in recommendation of Sherman, "that to his personal exertions he owed his success at Shiloh," which success was the imminent capture of his army, prevented by Buell according to the above report.

9th. In Badeau, page 93, he contradicts his report by stating that "the rebels were repelled in their last attack without any assistance from Buell that turned the scale."

10th. In his raid "Around the World with Young," at Hamburgh, he contradicts his report by the statement that Buell did not get up till after night of the 6th, and he was so well satisfied with the condition of affairs at night, before Buell came, that he could have beaten Beauregard next day without Buell's aid. (Of course with an army Buell had snatched from ruin.)

11th. By his statements indorsing Sherman's veracity he makes himself responsible for not less than two hundred of Sherman's falsehoods as to Shiloh, fifty or more of which were uttered under oath on Colonel Worthington's trial by court-martial at Memphis, August, 1862.

In Grant's official report are not less than twenty-five (25) false or deceptive statements, and for this and perhaps other reasons his report of Shiloh is not found in a single one of his biographies. According to the plainest rules of war as to marches, battles, and sieges, if he is responsible for his conduct during the civil war, that conduct cost the Republic without any return not less than a million of dollars, and at least 200 men a day for every day of his supposed service from June, 1861, to April, 1865, all of which, and more than is above stated, will be made plain by an inquiry by him, the Shermans, and their adherents, resisted since April, 1862.

FALSEHOOD OF GRANT

— AS TO —

GENERAL JOHNSON'S FALL,

Grant, while Around the World with Young, claims to have
been the

VICTOR AT SHILOH,

and that at the time (2.30 P. M.) of

SYDNEY JOHNSON'S DEATH

he was the vanquished commander of a flying army, out of whose
power and his own the victory had passed, before he died,

TO GRANT.

TO WHICH FALSE STATEMENT HE IMPUDENTLY CALLS GEN.
JOHNSON'S FRIENDS IN EVIDENCE, WHICH IS GIVEN IN
DIRECT CONTRADICTION OF GRANT AND YOUNG,
UNDER WHOSE TUTELAGE THE ENTIRE
LIE WAS TOLD.

The crowning atrocity of these actual or invented "Reminiscences
of the Civil War," first emitted from Hamburg, Germany,
1878, and shifted to Hong Kong in 1879, is the above
fiction of this "Duke of the Long Bow."

*Thus ruthlessly robbing his tutor, Sherman, of his long-worn laurels
in the practice of the LYRE.*

J. R. YOUNG AROUND THE WORLD WITH GRANT.

CHAPTER XL, PAGE 473.

Death of General Albert Sydney Johnson, at Shiloh, 2½ p. m., April 6, 1862.

In answer to a question whether the death of General Johnson, at Shiloh, affected the result, General Grant said:

“I never could see that it did. On the contrary, I should think that the circumstances that attended his death, as reported by his friends, show that the battle was *against him when wounded*.

“That he was rallying his troops at the time, and lost his life because he would not abandon his troops to have his wound dressed. The battle was so pressing (against him) that he would not leave, and so he bled to death.

“All that he could do for the battle of Shiloh was done before he was killed. The battle was out of his hands and out of that of his army.” (*Eleven lies in ten lines.*)

Now, in reply to this fiction of Sherman’s Washington, Duke of the Long Bow, &c., here follows what General Johnson’s friends have always said:

Extract from Colonel William Preston Johnson’s History of General Albert Sydney Johnson, page 612.

“The crest was gained; the enemy were in flight, &c. At this moment Governor Harris rode up from the right. After a few words, General Johnson sent him with an order to Colonel Statham, which having delivered, he speedily returned.

“Meantime groups of Federal soldiers kept up an angry discharge of firearms as they retreated.

“By the chance of war, a minie-ball from one of them did its fatal work. It came in the moment of victory from a flying foe,” &c.

Governor Harris makes an equivalent statement, as follows:

"The charge of General Johnson had been successful. I approached him and asked eagerly, 'Are you wounded?' He said no, and then sent me with an order to Colonel Statham, 200 yards off. I galloped to Colonel Statham, delivered the order, galloped back to the General, and said, 'Your order is delivered.'

"As I was uttering this sentence the General reeled from me. I put my left arm around his neck and said, 'General, are you wounded?' In a deliberate and emphatic tone he answered, 'Yes; and I fear severely.'

"He answered nothing further, and did not live more than 30 or 40 minutes after he was wounded."

So much for Washington Grant, the Duke, as to Shiloh.

Here, now, is what Colonel Geddes, 8th Iowa volunteers, reports as to General Johnson's "*falling back*," when wounded, about 2½ p. m., April 6, 1862:

"About 3 p. m. all communication with the river (landing) ceased, and it became evident to me that the enemy was turning the right and left flanks of our army," &c.

About 2 p. m. the whole Union right, comprising the 46th Ohio, which had held that flank 2 hours or more, was driven back in disorder, and the Confederate flanking force cut the centre off from the landing, as stated by Colonel Geddes, soon after General Johnson's fall.

Here also is what the Duke himself says about the falling back of the Confederates about 5 p. m., or a little sooner, on the 6th:

Grant's admission of General Johnson's victory April 6, 1862, which he claims now he had won himself when Johnson fell.

"The enemy having forced the centre line to fall back nearly half-way from their camps to the landing at a late hour in the afternoon, a desperate effort was made by the enemy to turn our left and get possession of the landing, transports, &c. (*i. e.*, remnant of the army).

"Just at this moment General Buell's advance, under command of Generals Nelson and Auman, arrived, and the enemy was soon driven back."

T. WORTHINGTON,
Late Colonel 46th Ohio Vol. Inf.

Facts Developed as to the Battle of Shiloh by Colonel Worthington's Court-Martial, August, 1862.

Colonel Worthington's court-martial, provoked by him as the only means of obtaining official evidence of the criminalities of two or more Union commanders at Shiloh, developed the following facts as to the condition of the army before the battle, all evidence as to facts during the battle being ruled out by the court in accordance with General Sherman's *private* order.

1st. It was proven that no clothing or intrenching tools could be had while the army was at Shiloh for sixteen or eighteen days before the battle.

2d. That Colonel Worthington insisted about a week before the battle that we would be attacked, and complained of the want of tools (to fortify his front.) (See McDowell's evidence.)

3d. That Colonel Worthington warned the division commander repeatedly of an impending attack. (Sherman's evidence.)

4th. That General Sherman refused to supply intrenching tools on a requisition made by Colonel Worthington a week before the battle and till after the same had occurred.

5th. That it was General Sherman's opinion under oath that the construction of defensive works would have been an indication of weakness, inviting an attack.

6th. That General Sherman, on his own evidence, had reason to expect an attack on the 3d of April, three days before the battle.

7th. Sherman testified that Buell's troops had been rightfully expected for two weeks, in face of the fact, to him known, that Buell's subordinate commanders had had

notice not to reach Savannah before the 7th or 8th, two or three days after the intended and expected attack.

8th. After swearing that there was no gap in the Union front, he testified that a gap of a mile had been left for Buell's 40,000 men, requiring eight miles, and that Buell's troops were nevertheless to be sent to Hamburgh, on the river two miles above Shiloh.

9th. Sherman testified that on Friday, the 4th of April, there were hostile cavalry, artillery, and infantry constituting an army in his front; yet he did not know its destination, and had to guess its purpose, and there was no danger of an immediate attack.

10th. It was proven that the pickets of three brigades of the 5th division were driven back on the 5th, the day before the battle, which he on oath denied, having stated that there was no prospect of an immediate attack. (See Badeau's appendix.)

11th. It was proven that a picket post three-quarters of a mile from his centre was all day occupied by the enemy, and with artillery in the afternoon, which he repeatedly swears was not the fact (on the 5th).

12th. He admitted that a position proven to be a picket post of the 1st brigade was but three-quarters of a mile from his centre, while swearing that Colonel Worthington's diary entry was false, that the pickets were scarce a mile out from the camp.

13th. It was proven that there was but one battery of artillery in line, and that on the extreme right, on the 5th, and the day of the intended attack, and on the 6th the second brigade next the river had no artillery during the battle, he having four batteries and but two in action.

14th. It was proven that the pickets of the 46th Ohio, driven back on the 5th at 7 A. M., were but half a mile from the camp the balance of the day.

15th. It was proven that there were no cavalry scouts in front of the fifth (Sherman's) division during the day and

night before the battle, while, as known to Sherman, the Confederate line of battle was but one and a half miles from his front at Shiloh Church.

16th. It was proven that before the battle neither the brigade nor division commander had visited the pickets, though the attack had been for three days expected.

17th. It was proven that Colonel Worthington had visited his pickets; had regularly visited his hospital, in camp and on the march; had exercised the regiment in the firings for two weeks before the battle, and had kept two companies lying on their arms two or more nights before the battle, in view of an attack.

18th. That on the evidence of General Sherman, Colonel Worthington knew his duties well and had never neglected them; and on the evidence of the brigade commander, McDowell, he had warned him that we would be attacked Monday or Tuesday before the battle.

19th. The charge that the "*diary extracts*," for printing which he was arrested, were written after the battle, was disproven by both Sherman and McDowell, as also was proven the truth of the same, and far more criminality than he had charged was proven also.

20th. It was proven that he was not in command of the post at Lafayette, Tennessee, July 18, 1862, when charged by Sherman as drunk in command of the same; McDowell and Sherman being above him in command, and there at the time.

21st. Sherman having charged that he was drunk in presence of the regiment, it was proved that the regiment had evacuated the post two hours before the time charged, and four witnesses testified against his being drunk at all. Yet on this evidence he was "*cashiered* for being drunk on duty in command of the post" and "for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman," for printing the diary.

The sentence was approved and executed by Sherman September 16, 1862, and by Grant the 1st of October fol-

lowing. The proceedings were not referred to the Judge Advocate-General till the 4th of November, 1862, and were pronounced null and void on the 19th following. Yet Colonel Worthington, through the enmity of Grant and the Shermans, was not returned to his command, but repeatedly recommended to be dismissed by the President as an officer of "well-known incompetency," in face of Senator John Sherman's statement and other evidence, as follows:

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1862.

SIR: Colonel Thomas Worthington, of 46th Ohio regiment, was authorized by General Cameron on the 29th of August, 1861, to raise a regiment, but it was not completed and sworn into service until December. He is a graduate at West Point, showed great ability at the battle of Shiloh, and is believed to be far superior to several officers who, by filling their regiments sooner, outrank him. It is the desire, I am informed, of all his superior officers that he rank from the date of his appointment, August, 1861. Cannot that order be made? If so, it will, in my opinion, promote the public service. I inclose a copy of a note from General Sherman upon the subject.

Very respectfully yours,

JOHN SHERMAN.

L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.

(For evidence as to Sherman's conduct, see "Grant at Shiloh," Part 2.)

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